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Employer Recapture of ERISA Contributions Made by
Mistake: A Federal Common Law Remedy To Prevent
Unjust Enrichment
American workers largely depend on the private pension system
for their retirement income. Nearly 900,000 pension and benefit plans
comprise the nation's nongovernmental retirement security system,
providing coverage to over seventy-six million employees. 1 Collectively these plans post assets in excess of $1. 7 trillion, 2 controlling
twenty to twenty-five percent of the equity and forty percent of the
outstanding corporate bonds in the United States. 3 Because of the
market leverage they exert, commentators have described private pension funds as "the largest single pool of capital in the world. " 4 The
declining ability of the Social Security system to serve as an exclusive
source of retirement security, 5 coupled with the strain placed upon
public programs by a disproportionately aging population, 6 amplify
the continuing importance of private sector sponsorship of retirement
benefits. 7
This vast scheme to care for retired employees depicts the archetypal tension between the benefits of public regulation and the reduction in private initiative such curatives frequently engender. In
response to abuses within the private pension system, Congress enacted the sweeping Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
1. Pensions at Risk: Can the Department of Labor Effectively Audit Private Retirement
Funds?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the House Comm. on
Govt. Operations, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989) [hereinafter Pensions at Risk] (statement of
Chairman Lantos).
2. See Swoboda, Official Urges Hands-off Private Pension System, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1990,
at AS, col. 3 (quoting David Ball, Asst. Secretary of Labor). Experts predict that this amount
will nearly double by the tum of the century, reaching almost $3 trillion. See Pensions at Risk,
supra note I, at 8 (testimony of Raymond Maria, Inspector General, U.S. Dept. Labor). To put
this figure in perspective, the U.S. national debt is approximately $3.2 trillion. See Curry, Budget
Pact's Secret - Biggest Deficit Ever, San Francisco Cheon., Nov. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
3. Rifkin, Pension Power, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1990, at D3, col. 4.
4. Id. As Rifkin observes, "U.S. pension funds are a reservoir of wealth that has emerged as
an economic force within the last 40 years • . . • Pension funds are now the largest source of
investment income for the American capitalist system." Id.
5. See S. REP. No. 294, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990); Employee Pension Protection Act of
1989: Hearings on S. 685 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Pension Protection Act of 1989]
(comments of Chairman Metzenbaum).
6. See S. REP. No. 294, supra note 5, at 3 (Americans living longer and retiring earlier).
7. The Bush administration has reaffirmed the nation's reliance on the private pension system. See Uchitelle, Company-Financed Pensions Are Failing to Fulfill Promise, N.Y. Times, May
29, 1990, Al, col. 5, at D5, col. 5 (" 'Our goal is that private pensions should provide a significant
share of retirement income, and for many more people.' ") (quoting Ann Combs, Deputy Asst.
Secy. Labor for pension and welfare benefits).
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(BRISA). 8 BRISA promulgated a reticulated structure of vesting, disclosure, reporting, and fiduciary requirements that apply to nearly all
private pension plans. 9 In contrast to its array of regulatory requirements, however, the Act also features exemptions and inducements
that encourage employers to establish private plans. BRISA is in fact
a carefully designed compromise. Sensitive to the need for vitality in
the private pension sector, Congress sought to minimize the disincentives that unduly burdensome or costly regulation poses to pension
plan formation and maintenance. BRISA thus exhibits a balancing
act between the necessity of governmental oversight of pensions and
the imperative of private sector initiative.
Section 403, the "exclusive benefit rule," best illustrates this tension within ERISA. 10 Determined to prevent abuse of pension funds
by imposing a strict fiduciary standard, Congress also sought to avoid
the negative incentives to pension plan formation fostered by inequitable treatment of employers. Declaring in one breath that "the assets of
a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held
for the exclusive purpose ofproviding benefits to participants," 11 Congress immediately carved an exception for employer contributions
made by mistake of fact or law. As tempered by the mistaken contribution provision, section 403(c)(2)(A), the exclusive benefit rule "shall
not prohibit" the refund of certain erroneously paid contributions. 12
The complexities of modem pension arrangements provide fertile
ground for contribution mistakes. 13 Employers make clerical and

8. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in
scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 31 and 42 U.S.C.) (1988) [hereinafter ERISA].
9. The narrow categories of exceptions to ERISA's purview are outlined in ERISA § 4, 29
u.s.c. § 1003(b) (1988).
10. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988).
11. ERISA § 403(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(l) (1988) (emphasis added).
12. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A) (1988), states:
In the case of a contribution, or a payment of withdrawal liability ...
(i) made by an employer to a plan (other than a multiemployer plan) by a mistake of
fact, paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of such contribution to the employer within
one year after the payment of the contribution, and
(ii) made by an employer to a multiemployer plan by a mistake of fact or law . . .
paragraph C (1) shall not prohibit the return of such contribution or payment to the employer within 6 months after the plan administrator determines that the contribution was
made by such a mistake.
13. Although this Note primarily discusses cases dealing with errors made in contributions
to the pension plan, mistakes may also occur in the payment of the withdrawal liability assessed
when employers exit pension plans. See, e.g., Huber v. Casablanca Indus., 916 F.2d 85 (3d Cir.
1990). By its terms, § 403 applies to both kinds of mistake. The escalating frequency of employer termination, see infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text, may increase the refund demands for mistaken withdrawal liability payments.
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arithmetic errors, 14 misunderstand their contribution obligations, 15 incorrectly assume an employee is covered under the terms of the pension plan, 16 contribute on behalf of ineligible employees, 11 make
payments on behalf of the wrong employee, 18 and contribute pursuant
to invalid agreements. 19 Interpretation of section 403, applicable to
these types of errors, has divided the federal courts of appeals due to
an ambiguity in its wording. Courts diverge over whether to construe
section 403's "shall not prohibit" language as permissive, as suggestive
of a statutory cause of action, as supportive of common law relief, or
as totally superfluous.
Three circuits - the First,20 Third, 21 and Sixth22 - have ruled
that employers have a federal common law remedy, based on an unjust
14. See, e.g., Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 814 F.2d 79 (2d
Cir. 1987) (clerical mistake); Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, 536 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ga.
1982) (accounting mistake compounded by computer error); Service Employees Intl. Union Local 82 Labor Management Trust Fund v. Baucom Janitorial Serv., 504 F. Supp. 197 (D.D.C.
1980) (accounting error).
15. See, e.g., Philippines, Micronesia & Orient Navigation Co. v. NYSA-ILA Pension Trust
Fund, 909 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1990) (unclear whether principal employer responsible for contributions for independent contractor's employees), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 515 (1990); Carter v.
CMTA-Molders & Allied Health & Welfare Trust, 736 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1984) (successor
employer followed predecessor's collective bargaining agreement); Central States, S.E. & S.W.
Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Borden, 736 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (employer not notified by union oflower contribution requirement); Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F.
Supp. 560 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (mistaken belief that plan was employer-funded}.
16. See, e.g, Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1989) (employee's job classification outside coverage of collective bargaining agreement); Electricians
Health, Welfare, & Pension Plans v. Gulino, 594 F. Supp. 1265 (M.D. La. 1984) (employee
withdrawn from union not entitled to benefits); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund
v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884 (D. Minn. 1979) (contributions on behalf of
employee not covered by agreement), affd, 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
17. See, e.g., Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957 (1st
Cir. 1989) (sole shareholder not permitted to receive benefits}; South Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. C & G Markets, 836 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1988) (payments on behalf of
probationary employees), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Chase v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund, 753 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1985) (owner-drivers of taxicabs not
eligible); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of Intl. Painters, 719 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1983) (sole
proprietors not eligible), modified, 724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983); Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 152 v. Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. W. Va. 1990) (self-employed employer).
18. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare, 618 F. Supp. 943 (D. Del.
1985) (contributions to truck driver fund erroneously made on behalf of maintenance employees}, modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988).
19. See, e.g., Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension
Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981) (expired agreement); Teamsters Local 639 Employers
Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); R.V. Cloud Co. v.
Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 566 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(same); E.M. Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 517 F. Supp. 1122
(D. Minn. 1981) (employees' participation in plan terminated by new collective bargaining
agreement).
20. Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989).
21. Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1989).
22. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794
F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986).
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enrichment theory, to recapture overpayments. The Eleventh23 and
Fifth Circuits24 have ruled that federal common law does not provide
relief to employers who err. Other circuits that permit employers to
recover monies paid by mistake fail to articulate the precise basis of
the cause of action. 25 The Fourth Circuit recently created an unjust
enrichment remedy in a factually similar setting, 26 and the language
and precedent on which it relied27 arguably support a restitutionary
remedy for employer contributions as well. 28
Finally, the Ninth Circuit deems the debate over federal common
law irrelevant, contending that BRISA evinces an intent to return erroneously paid contributions. The court construes a cause of action
directly from the statutory phrase, "shall not prohibit the return of
such contribution or payment."29 Because of its reliance on an implied cause of action, the Ninth Circuit summarily dismisses as irrelevant the question whether a common law remedy might be
appropriate. 30
Often, courts have settled upon an interpretation of section 403
without full investigation. Moreover, courts have decided the unjust
enrichment question when the issue was not squarely presented or vigorously pursued by the parties,31 yielding elliptical examination of the
23. Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1986).
24. South Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. C & G Mkts., 836 F.2d 221
(5th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
25. See, e.g., Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 814 F.2d 79 (2d
Cir. 1987) (return permitted only when trustee abuses discretionary refund authority); Peckham
v. Board of Trustees of Intl. Bhd. of Painters, 719 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1983) (same), modified,
724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale
Produce Supply Co., 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (affirming employer offset under
§ 1103(c)(2)(A)).
26. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1990), cerL
denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990).
27. See Provident Life, 906 F.2d at 993 (citing the Third Circuit's Plucinski decision and
relying on the mistaken contribution section, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A), for analogous support).
28. See, e.g., Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 152 v. Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172,
1174 (N.D.W.V. 1990) (reading Provident Life as authorizing federal common law relief for mistaken payments).
29. Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund, 763 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986).
30. See British Motor Car Distrib. v. San Francisco Auto. Indus. Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d
371, 377 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to entertain discussion about federal common law of restitution
"particularly where this court does allow employers to bring suit under ERISA for restitution of
mistaken contributions").
31. See, e.g., Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 96465 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[R]efund rights were mentioned below only in passing. Nevertheless, since
•.. the case law is in some disarray, we take this opportunity to offer a modicum of guidance on
the subject.") (footnote omitted). The court closed by admitting that it "realize[d) that plaintiff
did not plead a claim for restitution per se," but nonetheless remanded the case for proceedings
consistent with the court's newly announced unjust enrichment views. 879 F.2d at 968 n.10. See
also Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Although the question
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policy implications of refund decisions. 32 This Note investigates more
fully the policies animating BRISA in order to ascribe an appropriate
construction to the mistaken contribution section.
Part I analyzes the Ninth Circuit's anomalous implied cause of action theory. Searching the legislative history as well as ERISA's language and structure, this Part finds lacking the requisite expression of
congressional intent to support a statutorily implied remedy. As an
alternative, Part II explores the appropriateness of common law relief.
Part II defends the creation of common law relief by the federal courts
as consistent with the direct and indirect evidence suggesting that
Congress envisioned judicial supplementation of BRISA. BRISA generally seeks the protection of employees' interests. Part III identifies
two subcomponents that comprise this goal: expansion of private pension coverage and protection of pension fund assets. Recognizing the
potential tensions between these considerations, Part III argues that
letting employers recoup overpayments optimizes achievement of both
goals. Part IV contends that this remedy should be typed an unjust
enrichment action. This Note embraces an equitable model for the
recovery of mistaken payments, capturing both statutory and traditional equitable concerns. Each of the circuits which permit recovery,
whether under the statute or common law, make equitable balancing
the touchstone of their analysis. 33 Part IV canvasses a range of considerations that bear on the refund decision and assesses their comparative weight.
I.

EXPRESS WEAKNESSES OF THE IMPLIED REMEDY THEORY

Before examining the merits of a common law remedy for mistaken contributions, it is first necessary to determine whether BRISA
provides a statutory remedy. If it does afford recourse, then a com[was] not well presented [and] not seriously pursued • .• we hold that no federal common law right
to recovery of the disputed contributions ••. exists.") (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, lower courts in these circuits adhere to these pronouncements as controlling
authority. See, e.g., Florida W. Coast Operating Engr. Local 925 Welfare Fund v. Sunbelt Sales
& Rentals, 732 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (both South Central and Dime Coal preclude federal common law recovery of mistaken payment); Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con,
Inc., 668 F. Supp. 560, 568 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (citing Dime Coal).
32. See, e.g., Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension
Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 233-36 (6th Cir. 1986) (announcing common law remedy without explaining relationship to ERISA policy objectives), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1007 (1986).
33. See, e.g., Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1057 (3d Cir. 1989)
(common law relief governed by "general equitable considerations"); Dumac Forestry Serv. v.
International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 637 F. Supp. 529, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 814 F.2d
79 (2d Cir. 1987) ("whether the cause of action derives from federal common law or is implied by
the statute," return of mistaken contributions guided by "general principles of equity"); Award
Serv. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund, 763
F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff praying for statutory relief"will have to establish that
the equities favor restitution in order to succeed on the merits"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081
(1986).
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mon law remedy is not only unnecessary, but inappropriate. BRISA
explicitly grants relief to a variety of actors in certain situations. For
example, the civil enforcement provision permits actions by the Secretary of Labor or by a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. 34 Despite the conspicuous absence of employers from the list of
enumerated parties in section 403, at least one court, as well as some
commentators, 35 maintain that a remedy may be implied directly from
BRISA. In Award Service, Inc. v. Northern California Retail Clerks
Unions, 36 the Ninth Circuit construed BRISA section 403(c)(2)(A)37
as indicating a congressional intent to provide statutory relief for employers who mistakenly contribute to pension plans.
This Part of the Note addresses the merits of the Ninth Circuit's
distinctive implied cause of action. Section A delineates the appropriate legal inquiry for implied rights of action, framing the controlling
question as one of legislative intent. Section B finds the language of
the statute itself devoid of any congressional purpose to imply a remedy. Section C draws a similar conclusion by evaluating the structure
of BRISA and comparing different sections of the statute. Finally,
section D traces BRISA's subsequent legislative history, finding further support from the amendment process that no remedy should be
implied. Part I concludes that the refusal of most courts to permit a
statutory remedy is supported by a proper reading of congressional
intent in passing BRISA.
A.

The Operative Question: Legislative Intent

By implying a remedy under section 403 of BRISA, the Ninth Circuit arguably overlooked the forest for the trees. Award Service, Inc. v.
Northern California Retail Clerks Unions involved a delinquency action against an employer by a multiemployer pension fund. The employer defended on the ground that it was entitled to a refund for prior
contributions made in error. 38 Interpreting section 403(c)(2)(A), the
court concluded that although this section provided no express cause
of action, an implied right of action was appropriate. 39 The court
rested its decision on the four-pronged test of Cort v. Ash, 40 which
34. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988).
35. See Note, An Employer's Implied Cause of Action for Restitution Under Section 403 of
ERISA, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 225 (1985) [hereinafter An Employer's Implied Cause ofAction];
Note, Implying a Statutory Right for Employers for the Return ofMistaken Overcontributions to a
Multiemployer-Employee Benefit Plan. 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 396 (1987) [hereinafter Implying a Statutory Right].
36. 763 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986).
37. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A), § 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(1988). For the text of § 403, see
supra note 12.
38. 763 F.2d at 1067.
39. 763 F.2d at 1068.
40. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort test asks:
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governs the implication of statutory remedies. Although the Award
Service court methodically addressed each of the Cort factors, 41 the
preeminent focus of its analysis should have been congressional intent.
The four factors are not entitled to equal weight; Supreme Court cases
subsequent to Cort uniformly treat the other issues as incidental to the
determinative question of congressional intent. 4 2
Courts imply statutory remedies to execute legislative intent; thus,
the relevant determination is whether Congress affirmatively intended
to confer such a cause of action in favor of employers. Award Service
applied an inappropriate standard by asking the wrong question.
Award Service relied on an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion, Fentron Industries v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 43 in analyzing the intent
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
41. Even assuming arguendo that each Cort factor merits equal consideration, the Award
Service resolution of them fails to make a persuasive case for an implied statutory remedy. For
instance, the court is not necessarily correct that the 1980 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amend·
ment Act (MPPAA), Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, amending§ 403(c)(2)(A) to expand the
scope of permissible recovery for employers who contribute by mistake, was intended for the
benefit of employers. See 763 F.2d at 1068. The MPPAA, like ERISA, was designed to protect
the economic interests of pension plan participants. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("1980 .•• amendments were
designed specifically to provide pension benefits for long-time employees and their beneficiaries...• The legislative history of [§ 403] does not indicate that the expansion of circumstances under which excess contributions could be returned to employers was intended to create
a right to such contributions."), ajfd. without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); 126 CoNo.
REc. 20,176 (1980) (explanation of Sen. Williams) (MPPAA protects participants and beneficiaries).
Moreover, the Cort test asks whether the statute, not a specific provision, was passed for the
benefit of a particular class. Even if§ 403 does operate in isolation to the benefit of employers, it
does so only as an incident to the overall purposes of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)
(congressional findings and declaration of policy for ERISA); see also Whitworth Bros. Storage
Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 233 (6th Cir. 1986)
("[T]he statute was passed to benefit employees, not employers, despite the specific provision of
§ 403(c)(2)(A)(ii).... That an employer might benefit from that subsection does not establish a
federal right and to so hold would ignore the thrust of ERISA and its purpose."), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1007 (1986). More than mere benefit to the class must be granted by the statute, and
courts typically demand a showing that "Congress intended to confer federal rights upon these
beneficiaries." Whitworth, 794 F.2d at 229 (quoting Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 724 (6th
Cir. 1984)). Such a showing is not tenable for employers under ERISA. See Central States, S.E.
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, 511 F. Supp. 38, 47 (D.
Minn. 1980) (ERISA was "enacted for the especial benefit of participants" and "not for the
especial benefit of employers"), ajfd., 642 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1981).
42. See, e.g.. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984) ("focus must be
on the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in question"); Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) ("key to the [implied remedy]
inquiry is the intent of the Legislature"); Northwest Airlines v. Transport. Workers Union, 451
U.S. 77, 91 (1981) (touchstone is "whether Congress intended to create the private remedy").
43. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982).
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issue. Fentron permitted an employer injured by a pension plan's failure to pay benefits to bring suit against the fund. 44 The Fentron panel
interpreted BRISA to provide an implied remedy by asking whether
"Congress intentionally omitted employers" from section 502.45 The
court concluded that Congress did not, and held that "the statute does
not prohibit employers from suing to enforce its provisions."46 Drawing heavily on the reasoning of Fentron, the Award Service court ruled
that employers were not affirmatively barred from seeking a refund for
mistaken payments; accordingly, it concluded that they possessed a
statutory cause of action. 47
Award Service's finding that section 403 did not forbid this cause of
action ended its inquiry; the court erred by not attempting to determine whether such relief was actually intended. As the Second Circuit
aptly objected in Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Security
Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 48 the focus is "not on whether the
legislative history reveals that Congress intended to prevent actions by
employers or other parties, but instead on whether there is any indication that the legislature intended to grant subject matter jurisdiction
over suits by employers, funds, or other parties not listed in
§ l 132(e)(l)."4 9
The Award Service court should have ascertained whether Congress included an unjust enrichment remedy in BRISA itself. The remainder of Part I more closely investigates the indicia of congressional
intent slighted by the court in Award Service. Among the aids available in determining congressional intent are the language, structure,
and legislative history of the statute. so Examining these circumstantial
indicators of intent, this Part concludes that Congress did not intend
to provide a remedy for employers in BRISA.

44. 674 F.2d at 1303.
45. 674 F.2d at 1305 (footnotes omitted).
46. 674 F.2d at 1305 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
47. Award Service, 163 F.2d at 1068.
48. 700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983).
49. 700 F.2d at 892; accord Tuvia Convalescent Center v. National Union of Hosp. & Health
Care Employees, 717 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 463 U.S. 1233 (1983); see also International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local #1 v. Menard & Co. Masonry Bldg.
Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 1457, 1460 (D.R.I. 1985):
Fentron, however, appears to stand logic on its head. Given the natural constraints on the
scope of federal jurisdiction ... the question is not whether the national legislature affirmatively intended to bar suits by employers, trust funds, and others not specifically identified in
§ 1132(a)'s laundry list, but whether Congress affirmatively intended that unnamed others
should be permitted access to a federal forum.
50. See Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981). The
Cort test cannot be invoked persuasively without an affirmative showing that one of these factors
suggests affirmative congressional intent. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 323 (2d ed. 1987).
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B. Statutory Language
The cardinal indicator of legislative intent is, of course, the language chosen by the legislature to express itself. 51 Nothing in the text
of section 403 suggests a congressional desire to give employers a
cause of action. Congressional election of merely permissive language,
le., "shall not prohibit the return of such contribution or payment,"
implies no affirmative intention to create a remedy.s 2 The legislative
history's description of this provision speaks in equally unavailing
terms.s 3 Congress ordinarily does not employ such tepid language
when granting a right of action.s4
In instances where Congress did intend to create an explicit cause
of action for employers, it found no difficulty expressing itself clearly.
Section 4301, dealing with withdrawal liabilities, authorizes a "plan
fiduciary, employer, plan participant, or beneficiary, who is adversely
affected by the act or omission of any party under this subtitle" to seek
relief. ss Comparison of the language of these two sections, both granting causes of action to specified parties, suggests that Congress harbored no intent to give employers a statutory remedy in section 403. 56
The use of permissive language, rather than more direct or forceful
terminology, strongly argues against implying a remedy under section
403.
51. See 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CoNsr. §§ 46.01-.07 (4th ed. 1984).
52. See Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he
language of§ 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) of ERISA is permissive, simply allowing pension funds to refund
monies. Merely giving permission does not imply that Congress also wanted employers to be
able to force the refund of contnoutions."); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund,
549 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("Congress apparently chose not to use the word 'mny,' a
word which might suggest, arguably, a direction to the trustees to take affirmative steps to determine and return mistaken contributions.•.. [T]he use of the phrase, 'are not prohibited' expresses an intent to allow, but not require, the trustees to return contributions . • • ."), ajfd.
without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 {3d Cir. 1983).
53. As the House Conference Report explained, § 403 "allows an employer's contributions to
be returned ..• in certain limited situations." H.R. CoNP. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5083 (emphasis added).
54. See Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943,
949 (D. Del. 1985) (less than equivocal language suggests no intention to grant action), modified,
850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp.
307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same), affd. without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 {3d Cir. 1983).
55. ERISA § 4301(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a){l) (1988) (emphasis added).
56. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1984) (the "carefully
integrated" provisions of ERISA "provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly"); Whitworth Bros. Storage
Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 228 (6th Cir. 1986) (in
light of reference to "employer'' in§ 1451, "Congress' failure to specifically mention the term
'employer' in § 502 can, therefore, be construed as meaning that Congress intended to exclude
employers from the provisions of that section"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1007 (1986); Airco Indus.
Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund of Philadelphia, 618 F. Supp. 943, 949 (D.
Del. 1985) ("In other parts ofERISA, Congress has specifically included employers •.• in listing
persons entitled to bring actions ...."), modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Grand
Union Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Assn., 808 F.2d 66, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (employer "may not fit a Title IV handle on a Title I claim").
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C. Structural Obstacles

ERISA's structure similarly fails to demonstrate the predicate of
an intended statutory remedy. Section 403, granting the putative refund right to employers, does not appear in the subtitle of BRISA
authorizing causes of action, but rather among the :fiduciary duty provisions. 57 Had Congress intended to give employers a cause of action,
logically it would have placed it with the sections creating causes of
action. Furthermore, permitting employers to sue requires a malleable
interpretation not only of section 403, but also a relaxation of section
502's civil enforcement provision. 58 Section 502 explicitly lists the
parties empowered to bring a civil action to enforce ERISA's provisions, including section 403. Thus implying a cause of action under
section 403 requires, sub silentio, expansion of section 502. Judicial
manipulation of section 502 must be approached cautiously for a variety of reasons.
The first reason not to expand section 502 derives from the maxim
of statutory construction that the enumeration of some parties implicitly excludes any others. 59 Second, the listing at issue in section 502
informs a number of other provisions of BRISA. BRISA frequently
makes reference to "participants, beneficiaries, and :fiduciaries."60 Expanding the strict boundaries of this listing for purposes of recovering
mistaken contributions could have unanticipated repercussions
throughout ERISA's superstructure. 6 1
The jurisdictional aspects of section 502 offer a third reason not to
tamper with it. Section 502(e)(l) confers exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases brought under that subchapter. 62 In analo57. See Soft Drink lndep. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679
F. Supp. 743, 747 (N.D. ID. 1988) (implied remedy textually insupportable due to location in
fiduciary duty section). Compare Title I.B, Part 4, captioned "Fiduciary Responsibility," 29
U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 with Title I.B, Part 5, captioned "Administration and Enforcement," 29
u.s.c. §§ 1131-45 (1988).
58. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988).
59. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See 2A SUTIIERLAND STAT. CoNST., supra note 51,
at§§ 47.23-47.25 (designation of certain persons may raise inference that omissions are deliberate exclusions). For ERISA cases applying this rule to bar suit by unenumerated parties, see,
e.g., Giardano v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1989); Pfefferle v. Solomon, 718 F. Supp.
1413, 1419 (E.D. Wis. 1989); In re Estate of Sheppard, 658 F. Supp. 729, 734 (C.D. ID. 1987).
60. See, e.g., ERISA § 502(b)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(b)(l)(B) (actions against Internal Revenue Code qualified plans); ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (actions to compel administrative disclosure); ERISA § 502(e)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (federal court jurisdiction); ERISA
§ 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (recovery of attorney fees); ERISA § 502(h), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h)
(service of process requirements); ERISA § 502(k), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(k) (suits against the Secretary of Labor) (1988).
61. See International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local #1 v. Menard & Co.
Masonry Bldg. Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 (D.R.I. 1985) (§ 1132 listing pivotal to
other clauses of statute).
62. ERISA § 502(e)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (1988). Part I of this Note limits itself to
examination of whether Congress reposited relief in the statute. The failure of§ 1132 to confer
specific jurisdiction on federal courts to hear suits by employers does not totally foreclose the
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gous situations, courts have refused to expand the scope of statutory
remedies to parties beyond those enumerated in section 502. 63 Thus
pension funds, 64 unions, 65 and health care providers66 have all been
possibility of a federal cause of action for unjust enrichment. Although plaintiffs would be precluded from claiming jurisdiction under ERISA's specific statutory grant; two arguable bases of
jurisdiction would still exist to decide whether a statutory or common law cause of action existed.
The first, and cleanest, ground for jurisdiction is general federal question jurisdiction. The
federal courts are, of course, empowered to hear "all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). It seems sufficient for a finding
of federal question jurisdiction to require, as the Fourth Circuit has, that the "issue presented,
whether it be the creation of federal common law or the interpretation of a specific BRISA
provision" be "of 'central concern' " to BRISA. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller,
906 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990). An action for the return of
mistakenly paid monies to a pension fund easily meets the "central concern" test. See Airco
Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1988).
Federal question jurisdiction poses one interesting question, although beyond the scope of
this Note's full consideration. Section 502(e) of BRISA, 29 U.S.C. l 132(e)(l) (1988), grants
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising under it. Although federal common law
definitively will support§ 1331 jurisdiction, see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100
(1972), it is an open question whether ju.-isdiction over the common law claim would also be
exclusive.
An alternative basis of jurisdiction could conceivably be 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988), conferring
jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear claims arising under an Act of Congress regulating
interstate commerce. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 8 n.7 (1983) (suggesting that § 1337 jurisdiction might support BRISA claims) (dictum).
BRISA declares as one of its many purposes the protection and facilitation of interstate commerce. See BRISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. §§ lOOl(a), lOOl(b), lOOl(c), lOOla(c), and lOOlb(c) (1988)
(findings and declaration of policy). The legislative history also suggests that protection of commerce partially motivated ERISA's passage. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4849; H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4640, 4646-7.
Premising jurisdiction on§ 1337, however, engenders one serious obstacle not found if§ 1331 is
used instead. Although the test for when an action "arises under" is the same for both §§ 1331
and 1337, technically § 1337 has not yet been held to support common law actions. See Crown
Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund of Philadelphia, 549 F. Supp. 307, 310 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
1982), affd. without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); Wong v. Bacon, 445 F. Supp. 1177,
1186 n. 12 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Hence common law actions might enjoy § 1331 but not § 1337
jurisdiction.
63. Independent of attempts to expand the array of parties capable of bringing suit by arguing that they are implicitly included in ERISA's specific enumeration, some plaintiffs have also
tried to stretch beyond ordinary meaning the definitions of parties specified in the statute. Despite this creativity, courts have refused to consider employers, for purposes of ERISA, to be
"beneficiaries," see, e.g., R.M. Bowler Contract Hauling Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund, 547 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D. Ill. 1982); or "employees," see, e.g., Modem Woodcrafts, Inc. v. Hawley, 534 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Conn. 1982).
64. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); Northeast Dept. ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 153 (6th Cir. 1985); Carpenters Dist.
Council of Kansas City Pension Fund v. Bowlus School Supply, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1232, 1233-35
(W.D. Mo. 1989). See generally Annotation, Right of Pension Plan, As Entity, to Bring Civil
Enforcement Action Under§ 502 ofEmployee Retirement Income Security Act of1974, 67 A.L.R.
FED. 947 (1984).
65. See, e.g., New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. State of N.J. 747 F.2d 891, 893 (3d Cir. 1984);
District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row Publishers, 576 F. Supp. 1468, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
66. See, e.g., Lifetime Medical Nursing Serv. v. New England Health Care Employees Welfare Fund, 730 F. Supp. 1192, 1195 (D.R.I. 1990); Pritt v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 699 F.
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denied the privilege to sue under ERISA. 67 The express jurisdictional
grant in the statute represents Congress' judgment as to which parties'
access to the federal courts effectuates ERISA's purposes.68
As the Supreme Court has observed, ERISA is for better or worse,
"a 'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' which Congress adopted
after careful study of private retirement pension plans. " 69 BRISA provides oversight and investigative authority to monitor compliance with
its scheme. 70 It features specifically enumerated civil remedies71 and
criminal penalties72 for violations of its commands. Where Congress
endows a statute with an elaborate enforcement structure, courts
should not imply additional rights of action. 73 Declining to imply a
private remedy under BRISA section 409,74 the Supreme Court in
Supp. 81, 84 (S.D.W.V. 1988); Cameron Manor, Inc. v. United Mine Workers, 575 F. Supp.
1243, 1245-46 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
67. Parties that perform two different roles under BRISA, one of which would enable them
to litigate and one that would not, are not thereby precluded from bringing suit. See, e.g., Great
Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101 (6th Cir. 1983) (employer performing fiduciary role as
administrator of plan permitted to litigate); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commonwealth of Pa. Human
Relations Commn., 669 F.2d 124, 128 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
68. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborer's Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21 (1983); see
also Giardano v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1989) (cannot imply a cause of action for any
non-enumerated parties); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286,
1289 (5th Cir. 1988) (hewing "to a literal construction of § 1132(a)"); International Union of
Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local #1 v. Menard & Co. Masonry Bldg. Contractors, 619 F.
Supp. 1457, 1460 (D.R.I. 1985) ("Where Congress has carefully catalogued a select list of persons eligible to sue in a federal forum under BRISA, it seems gratuitous - and wrong - for the
courts to override that policy judgment by expanding the array.").
69. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) (quoting Nachman Corp.
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
70. See BRISA §§ 504-07, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1134-37 (1988).
71. See BRISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988).
72. See BRISA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1988).
73. See Giardano v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1989); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., 838
F.2d 1173, 1174 (11th Cir.) ("Congress' express inclusion of several specific remedies in [BRISA]
represents an implicit exclusion of remedies not listed."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988);
Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 560, 568 (S.D. Miss. 1987) ("[l]t would be
inappropriate to imply a private right of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1103. BRISA contains detailed limitations and requirements as to which party to the agreement may sue for what."); cf.
Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93-94 (1981) (comprehensive
title VII remedial scheme counsels against judicial creation of additional private relief). According to Judge Posner, this injunction against judicial expansion of statutory remedies derives from
democratic theory:
The whole question of "implied" rights of action is deeply vexed. It lies at the crux of a
series of debates over statutory interpretation. Those judges who believe that most statutes
are compromises between rival interest groups hesitate to create implied rights of action no
matter how defective a statute's remedial scheme without them, for they believe that in all
likelihood the absence of effective remedies was a part of a compromise that enabled the
statute to be passed, and they rightly do not want to undo the compromise. Those who
believe that a regulatory statute should be viewed not as the point of balance between conflicting interest groups but as a straightforward effort to eliminate abuses do not hesitate to
enforce a statute by whatever means are expedient.
Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir. 1987).
74. BRISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988).
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Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell adverted to the
deference due congressional prerogative:
The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in
§ 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it
simply forgot to incorporate expressly. The assumption of inadvertent
omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of
ERISA's interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial
scheme....
We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with
such evident care as the one in BRISA.75

The same conclusion follows with respect to restitutionary actions
by employers. As the First Circuit reasoned in parting company with
the Ninth Circuit on the implied cause of action theory, because "Congress has carefully catalogued a selected list of persons eligible to sue
under BRISA, there is no plausible rationale for us gratuitously to
enlarge the roster." 76 Although employers no doubt contribute to
BRISA's overall success, Congress' considered judgment was that
BRISA did not require that employers have a cause of action under
the statute.77 The interdependence of the statute's remedies with its
substantive provisions should not be disturbed. 7 s

D. Subsequent History
Congress' handling of proposed amendments to BRISA also suggests that it did not intend a right to sue for return of overpayments.
The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 198079 amended
Title I of BRISA by broadening the scope of the mistaken contribution
section to include mistakes of both fact and law. 80 Despite this relaxa75. 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985).
76. Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 965 (1st Cir.
1989).
77. See Estate of Sheppard, 658 F. Supp. 729, 734 (C.D. ID. 1987) ("[A]lthough Congress
certainly felt employers and administrators were important to the proper functioning ofERISA's
regulatory scheme, it provided them no power under the act to institute a civil action."); cf.
Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he question is not whether the statute's
ostensible purposes would be served by adding a private right of action to the remedies expressly
provided, but whether Congress consciously intended (without bothering to say) that there
should be a private right of action •..."), cert. denied. 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
78. The conclusion that the comprehensive legislative scheme forecloses the implication of
statutory remedies should not, however, be read to obviate the creation of common law relief. As
Justice Brennan pointed out in his Russell concurrence, "ERISA was not so 'carefully integrated'
and 'crafted' as to preclude further judicial delineation of appropriate [common law] rights and
remedies; far from barring such a process, the statute explicitly directs that courts shall undertake it." 473 U.S. at 157; see also infra notes 132-67 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress intended judicial development of common law for ERISA).
79. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1296 (1980) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988)).
80. See Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 410(a) (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § l103(c)(2)(A) (1988)),
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tion of existing refund procedure, no effort was made to grant employers a cause of action to enforce section 403. The 1980 amendments
did, however, give employers a right of action against plans for claims
involving mistaken payments of withdrawal liabilities, 81 further weakening the argument that Congress intended, but forgot, to include a
cause of action for employers in section 403. 82
The Ninth Circuit stands alone in its adherence to the implied
remedy; all of the other circuits to address the theory have rejected
it. 83 Strong textual, structural, and historical arguments rebut any
suggestion of congressional intent to give employers a cause of action
under section 403. As the balance of this Note makes clear, however,
congressional silence as to a statutory cause of action leaves open the
possibility of common law relief for employers.
II. SUPPLEMENTING BRISA WITH FEDERAL COMMON LAW

Despite the lack of express or implied statutory relief, employers
making excess payments to pension funds are not necessarily without a
remedy. Some lower federal courts recognize that since "the contract
between the parties, the pension plan and incorporated provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement, and the rights and remedies implicit therein or necessary to the enforcement thereof" 84 are governed
by federal law, employers may make a claim for restitution, based on
unjust enrichment, under federal common law. This Part maintains
that BRISA's purpose and structure invite federal courts to augment
the statutory framework by crafting such common law remedies where
necessary to effectuate BRISA's objectives. An examination of
BRISA's preemption of state law is taken up in section A. Section B
chronicles congressional expectation that the federal courts would embellish BRISA with a body of federal common law; section C critiques
the reasoning of those courts that have failed to fashion common law
accordingly. Section D outlines the uniquely federal interests served
by the statute, arguing that a federal decision rule is needed to administer section 403 of BRISA.
81. See Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 104(2) (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1) (1988)).
82. See Grand Union Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Assn., 808 F.2d 66, 71 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (addition of title IV cause of action for employers proves none intended under title I);
Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 n.5 (11th Cir. 1986) (failure to give employer cause
of action under original ERISA, or under 1980 Amendments, proves deliberate congressional
choice).
83. See, e.g., Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting both statutory and common law remedy); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W.
Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.) (disagreeing with Award Service, but finding common law relief), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986).
84. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794
F.2d 221, 233 (6th Cir. 1986).
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A. Preemption of State Unjust Enrichment Actions

Restitution actions premised on unjust enrichment are traditionally creatures of state common law. 85 Prior to ERISA's enactment,
employers could recapture erroneous pension payments through an
unjust enrichment action under state law. 86 Congress concluded
BRISA, however, with a sweeping declaration that it had created an
exclusively federal sphere of interest by displacing all state laws87 re85. See, e.g., Hancock-Hazlett Gen. Constr. Co. v. Trane Co., 499 So. 2d 1385 (Ala. 1986);
Alaska Sales & Serv. v. Millet, 735 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1987); Blue Ridge Sewer Improvement
Dist. v. Lowry & Assocs., Inc., 149 Ariz. 373, 718 P.2d 1026 (Ct. App. 1986); Frigillana v.
Frigillana, 266 Ark. 296, 584 S.W.2d 30 (1979); Dinosaur Dev., Inc. v. White, 216 Cal. App. 3d
1310, 265 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Ct. App. 1989); Mt. Sneffels Co. v. Estate of Scott, 789 P.2d 464 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989); Connecticut Natl. Bank v. Chapman, 153 Conn. 393, 216 A.2d 814 (1966);
Home Ins. Co. v. Honaker, 480 A.2d 652 (Del. 1984); Williams v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitation Servs., 522 So. 2d 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Fleming v. Citizens & S. Natl.
Bank, 243 Ga. 144, 253 S.E.2d 76 (1979); Hong v. Kong, 5 Haw. App. 174, 683 P.2d 833 (Ct.
App. 1984); Jones v. Whitley, 112 Idaho 886, 736 P.2d 1340 (Ct. App. 1987); Charles Hester
Enters. v. Illinois Founders Ins. Co., 114 Ill. 2d 278, 499 N.E.2d 1319 (1986); Monroe Fin. Corp.
v. DiSilvestro, 529 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Newman v. Newman, 451 N.W.2d 843
(Iowa 1990); Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 665 P.2d 743 (1983); Codell Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co., 289
So. 2d 116 (La. 1974); City of Auburn v. Mandarelli, 320 A.2d 22 (Me. 1974); First Natl. Bank
of Md. v. Shpritz, 63 Md. App. 623, 493 A.2d 410 (Ct. Spec. App. 1985), cert. denied, 304 Md.
297, 498 A.2d 1184 (1985); Barry v. Covich, 332 Mass. 338, 124 N.E.2d 921 (1985); Schwanderer v. Huron-Clinton Metro. Auth., 329 Mich. 258, 45 N.W.2d 279 (1951); TCF Banking
& Sav. v. Loft Homes, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); First Natl. Bank of Jackson
v. Huff, 441 So. 2d 1317 (Miss. 1983); Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Jolley, 747 S.W.2d
704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Rust v. Kelly, 228 Mont. 220, 741 P.2d 786 (1987); Wendell's, Inc. v.
Malmkar, 225 Neb. 341, 405 N.W.2d 562 (1987); Nevada Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Benedetti, 103
Nev. 360, 741 P.2d 802 (1987); Patey v. Peaslee, 101 N.H. 26, 131 A.2d 433 (1957) (per curiam);
Farese v. McGarry, 237 N.J. Super. 385, 568 A.2d 89 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Albuquerque
Natl. Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982); Miller v.
Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 337 (1916); Thompson-Arthur Paving Co. v. Lincoln Battleground Assocs., 95 N.C. App. 270, 382 S.E.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1989); Johnson v. Estate of Kent,
In re Estate of Zent, 459 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1990); Aviation Sales, Inc. v. Select Mobile Homes,
48 Ohio App. 3d. 90, 548 N.E.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1988); McBride v. Bridges, 202 Okla. 508, 215
P.2d 830 (1950); Ying v. Lee, 65 Or. App. 246, 671 P.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1983); D.A. Hill Co. v.
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 524 Pa. 425, 573 A.2d 1005 (1990); Jonklaas v. Silverman, 117 R.I.
691, 370 A.2d 1277 (1977); Harper v. McCoy, 276 S.C. 170, 276 S.E.2d 782 (1981); Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Strain, 432 N.W.2d 259 (S.D. 1988); Roach v. Underwood, 192 Tenn. 378, 241
S.W.2d 498 (1951); Bryan v. Citizens Natl. Bank in Abilene, 628 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1982); Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Norfolk & Dedham Fire Ins.
Co. v. AETNA Casualty & Sur. Co., 132 Vt. 341, 318 A.2d 659 (1974); Belcher v. Kirkwood,
238 Va. 430, 383 S.E.2d 729 (1989); Eaton v. Engelcke Mfg., 37 Wash. App. 677, 681 P.2d 1312
(Ct. App. 1984); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Couch, 376 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1988); Hendricks
v. MCI, Inc., 152 Wis.2d 363, 448 N.W.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1989); Pancratz Co. v. KloefkornBallard Constr. Dev., Inc., 720 P.2d 906 (Wyo. 1986).
86. See, e.g., Reuther v. Trustees of Trucking, 575 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1978) (claim arising
before ERISA's enactment); McHugh v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 638 F. Supp. 1036, 1048
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); Hardy v. National Kinney, 565 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(same); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478
F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.) (same), ajfd., 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
87. State laws will be used throughout this Note to mean either statutory or common law
rules. As defined by BRISA, " 'state law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
state action having effect of law •..• " BRISA§ 514(C)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(l) (1988). For
preemption cases treating common law causes of action under the 'state law' rubric of§ 514, see,
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lating to pensions. The facial expanse of ERISA's preemption provision, contained in section 514, immodestly "supersede[s] any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan .... " 88 Despite the Supreme Court's candid description
of the preemption provision as "perhaps ... not a model of legislative
drafting," 89 one unifying theme can be distilled from the Court's treatment of it: state laws of general application are preempted when their
application has reference to or connection with an BRISA plan. 90
State unjust enrichment actions, in the context of mistaken contributions, exhibit the requisite connection to pension plans to be
preempted.
1. Preemptive Language
In deciding whether BRISA preempts a state law cause of action,
the Court determines whether Congress intended to supplant relevant
state law. The Court looks to ERISA's explicit language as well as its
structure and purpose.9 1 Examining first ERISA's statutory language,
the sweep of section 514's "relate[s] to" formulation reaches broadly.
The precise language chosen underscores the breadth of the provision;
Congress rejected earlier versions of the preemption clau8e limited to
the specific subject matters covered by BRISA. 92 Congr~s also resisted suggested wording changes by the executive branch that would
have made the preemption language much more specific and hence,
narrow.9 3 Congress gave the 'State law' preempted by BRISA an ine.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mclendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990) (wrongful discharge); Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (tort & contract); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58 (1987) (same).
88. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
89. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
90. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
91. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 482 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
92. Compare H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 514(a), 120 CoNG. REc. 4717, 4742 (1974) (limiting preemption to areas expressly covered by bill) and S. 4, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 699(a), 120
CoNG. REc. 4977, 5002 (1974) (preempting only those state laws dealing with subject matter of
ERISA) with ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
For an explanation of the changes, see 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (account of Sen. Javits)
("Both [original] House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law, but ... defined the
perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill."). As the Court pointed
out in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983), the earlier, specific preemption provision
was "rejected ..• in favor of the present language" indicating that the "section's preemptive
scope was as broad as its language." See also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 408 & n.3
(1990) (affixing significance to the rejection of more narrow phraseology).
93. See ADMlNISTRATION RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE CoNFEREES
ON H.R. 2 TO PROVIDE FOR PENSION REFORM, Apr. 1974, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
5047, 5145 (Comm. Print 1976). The recommended changes that were ultimately rejected were
urged initially because the administration expressed concern that "[t]he preemption provisions
under the House bill are extremely vague, while the Senate bill is too broad ...." Id. at 5146.
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elusive definition, further signifying preference for federal law. 94 As
the Court concluded early in its attempt to define BRISA's reach,
Congress expressed its desire that the preemption language be liberally
construed by its stated intention to "establish pension plan regulation
as exclusively a federal concem."95
Unquestionably, BRISA by its terms preempts state laws that directly involve and regulate employee pension funds. 96 In Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, 97 however, the Court refused to confine the ambit of
BRISA's preemption "to state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans. " 98 The Court reasoned that even a state law of
general application " 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan." 99 Although Shaw dealt only with statutory law, the Court's
subsequent treatment of common law causes of action has remained
faithful to this expansive interpretation of BRISA's language.
For example, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 100 the Court
held that state common law actions were preempted to the extent that
they related to BRISA. The Court inquired whether the plaintiff's
state law claim required a determination of issues of central concern to
ERISA. 101 Although state common law ordinarily governed tort and
contract actions, the unanimous Court concluded that the claims "undoubtedly" were preempted as they were "based on alleged improper
processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit
plan.... "1°2 The Court viewed as salient the relation of the state law,
as applied to the facts of a particular claim, to an BRISA-regulated
transaction or relationship.103
The Court's recent treatment of Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClen94. For the text of ERISA's definition of "state law," § 514(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(l)
(1988), see supra note 87.
95. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981); see also Dept. of Labor
Op. Letter No. 75-153 (Oct. 15, 1975) (ERISA's preemption of state law "essentially without
precedent").
96. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) (Georgia
garnishment statute specifically directed at employee benefit plans); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463
U.S. 85, 97-100 (1983) (New York law prohibiting employers from structuring employee benefit
plans in a discriminatory manner).
97. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
98. 463 U.S. at 98.
99. 463 U.S. at 97 (footnote omitted).
100. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). The same day that it decided Pilot Life, the Court also held that
state common law tort and contract actions for denial of benefits were not only preempted, but
also automatically removable to federal court. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
(1987).
101. The Pilot Life plaintiff, denied pension benefits, sued the plan on common law contract
and tort theories. 481 U.S at 43-47.
102. 481 U.S. at 48.
103. See 481 U.S. at 47-48.
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don 104 further illustrates its willingness to permit BRISA to override
state law. In McClendon, the Court considered whether BRISA preempted an employee's state common law claim for wrongful discharge. Reversing the Texas Supreme Court, a unanimous Court had
"no difficulty in concluding that ... a claim that the employer wrongfully terminated plaintiff primarily because of the employer's desire to
avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension
fund-'relate[s] to' an BRISA-covered plan within the meaning of
§ 514(a) ...." 105 The cause of action referred to and was premised on
the existence of a pension plan; BRISA therefore superseded it. "Because the court's inquiry must be directed to the plan, this judicially
created cause of action 'relates to' an BRISA plan." 106
As these cases demonstrate, the Court employs a functional definition of 'relates to,' analyzing whether the state law as applied in a
particular case makes BRISA, or an area of concern to BRISA, a substantive element of the claim. 107 State common law actions adjudicating claims involving an BRISA plan, transaction, or relationship
typically meet this test. 10s
These principles point to the conclusion that BRISA's preemption
provision comprehends state unjust enrichment actions for mistaken
contributions, because they implicate issues of primary importance to
the entire BRISA scheme. First, although ostensibly brought under a
state's general common law, the gravamen of the employer's complaint would necessarily make BRISA a substantive element of the
104. lll s. Ct. 478 (1990).
105. 111 S. Ct. at 483.
106. 111 S. Ct. at 483.
107. See Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888 (1985):
Although Authier's claim is predicated technically upon the Michigan common law cause of
action for discharge •.. as applied in this case, the action relates to an BRISA plan.•.. [H]e
was terminated for fulfilling his obligations under BRISA. BRISA created the public policy
element of the common law action•..• [E]ven though the Michigan cause of action regulates ostensibly employment relationships and not pension plans, preemption is not precluded in this specific application.
757 F.2d at 800; see also Lee v. B.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 894 F.2d 755, 756 (5th Cir.
1990) ("Pre-empted state law includes any cause of action that relates to an employee benefit
plan, even if the action arises under a general state law that in and of itself has no impact on
employee benefit plans."); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (same); Scott
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1505 (9th Cir. 1985) (preemption turns on whether challenged
conduct is "part of the administration of an employee benefit plan").
108. See, e.g., Straub v. Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1263 (10th Cir. 1988)
(breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation regarding pension plan); Shifiler v. Equitable
Life Assurance Socy., 838 F.2d 78, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1988) (common law claim for denial of death
benefits relates to benefit plan, "no matter how [the action was] characterized"); Anderson v.
John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1987) (contract); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807
F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987) (state law causes of action for benefit denial); Phillips v. Amoco
Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1469-70 (11th Cir. 1986) (fraudulent failure to disclose retirement benefit
information), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987); Pane v. R.C.A. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 168, 172-73
(D.N.J. 1987) (breach of contract and infliction of emotional distress claims); Justice v. Bankers
Trust Co., 607 F. Supp. 527, 531 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (fraud and misrepresentation by fiduciary).
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cause of action. 109 Second, any attempt by a participant, especially an
employer, to reach pension monies strikes at the heart of what BRISA
protects: the assets of the fund. 110 Third, the terms of the employee
benefit plan create the rights and obligations at issue in the lawsuit.
Determination of whether the employer should receive a refund necessitates examination of the pension agreement. 111 Fourth, because
common law remedies must be crafted in view of advancing statutory
aims, unjust enrichment actions require ascertainment of ERISA's
policy objectives, as well as assessment of how best to advance
them. 112 Fifth, the decision whether to allow an employer to recover
such funds will influence the relationship between the employer, employees, and administrator of the fund. Refused demands may generate resentment by employers; successful requests may lead employees
to suspect employer motivations. Securing harmony among participants is at the core of ERISA. 113 Finally, the return of mistakenly
paid funds implicates the trustee's fiduciary responsibilities, since refunding overpayments is the sole instance when trustees may transfer
109. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir.
1990) (unable to "see how a different result could ensue from a claim of unjust enrichment" in
light of Pilot Life and Taylor), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v.
Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 235 (6th Cir. 1986) ("clear thnt
federal, and not state, law applies" to refund of overpayments), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007
(1986); Chase v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744,
746 (9th Cir. 1985) (ERISA preempts any state claim for the restitution of contributions").
110. See Pension Fund-Local 701 v. Omni Funding Group, 731 F. Supp. 161, 170 (D.N.J.
1990) ("If a plaintiff seeks recovery of pension fund monies, the claim "relates to" the benefit
plan, no matter how the claim is characterized."); Simmons v. Prudential Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp.
675, 679 (D. Colo. 1986) ("It is difficult to imagine a situation arising out of a claim under an
employee benefit plan invoking a state law which would fall outside of this definition [of 'relates
to']"). But cf. Lifetime Medical Nursing Serv. v. New England Health Care Employees Welfare
Fund, 730 F. Supp. 1192, 1196 (D.R.I. 1990) (should "only apply the preemptive powers of
ERISA when a designated party brings suit" because "[p]reemption depends on the civil enforcement provision.").
111. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794
F.2d 221, 233-35 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). Because the restitution claim
"inevitably requires interpretation of the documents executed by the parties and the provisions
made therein for payment and refund of contributions," such a claim "relates to" an ERISA
plan, and therefore "federal, and not state, law applies" to such a claim. 794 F.2d at 234. See
also Kentucky Laborers Dist. Health Council v. Hope, 861 F.2d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 1988)
(common law fraud and restitution claims require interpretation of plan agreement and are preempted even when no interpretive dispute arises); cf. Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich, 871 F.2d 1290,
1294 (5th Cir. 1989) (computation of damages requiring reference to ERISA plan); Phillips v.
Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986) (fraud claim requiring interpretation of
fiduciary duties), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987).
111

112. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
s. Ct. 512 (1990).

113. See Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enter., 793
F.2d 1456, 1468-70 (5th Cir. 1986) (more willing to preempt state law "if it affects relations
among the principal ERISA entities - the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the
beneficiaries - than if it affects relations between one of these entities and an outside party .•. "),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); accord Pane v. RCA Corp, 667 F. Supp. 168, 173 (D.N.J.),
ajfd., 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1987).
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fund assets to employers. 114 Policing such transactions is clearly a
matter of federal concem.11s
2.

Uniformity Demands Preemption

The purpose underlying ERISA's preemption provision buttresses
the conclusion that the provision reaches state unjust enrichment actions for overpayment. Congress wanted to eliminate the possibility
that the law governing pension funds would differ from state to
state. 116 For instance, in the floor debate, Senator Jacob Javits, a
member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and
one of ERISA's chief sponsors, expressed concern about "[m]ultiple
and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with
some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not
clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme." 117 The fact that
single pension plans often covered employees in several states made it
even more imperative to standardize pension obligations. 118 In addition, the practical effects of a patchwork scheme on the nation's pension system argued for uniformity; as the bill's legislative history
makes clear, Congress wanted to "help administrators, fiduciaries and
participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws." 119
Most immediately, disparities in state laws pose the danger of less114. Mistaken contributions are the lone exception to the rule requiring fund assets to be
used for the exclusive benefit of employees. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
115. See BRISA§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(b) (1988) (declaration of policy to "establish[] standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans"); see
also Wong v. Bacon, 445 F. Supp. 1177, 1185-88 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (refunds implicate fiduciary
duties).
116. The necessity of uniformity also lends support to the case for the creation of a body of
federal common law under BRISA. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
117. 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974). Compare the remarks of Senator Harrison Williams,
Jr., the Chair of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the bill's other manager
in the Senate:
[T]he substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to
preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to
apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality
thereof, which have the force or effect of law.
120 CoNG REc. 29,933 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of
State Law Under ERISA, 1979 DUKE L. J. 383, 391 ("clear that Congress wished to protect
plans subject to BRISA from the additional burden of varying and possibly conflicting applications of state law").
118. See BRISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(a) (1988) (congressional findings of need for minimum national standards); see also S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4871 ("Because of the interstate character of employee
benefit plans, the Committee believes it essential to provide for a uniform system of law ....");
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4639, 4655.
119. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4639, 4650; see also S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4865.
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ened employee benefits. The Supreme Court recently held in FMC
Corp. v. Holliday 120 that BRISA preempted a state law forbidding employee welfare benefit plans from exercising subrogation rights on a
claimant's tort recovery. The Court worried that requiring "plan
providers to design their programs in an environment of differing State
regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide plans,
producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased
benefits." 121 Either the costs of tailoring plans to the disparate laws of
different states or the desire to eliminate classes of benefits subject to
state requirements with which it was unwilling to comply might
prompt the employer to reduce benefits. 122 As an alternative to reducing benefits, employers might retard the rate of retirement plan formation.123 Employers could likewise attempt to recoup costs
immediately by reducing wages. 124 Such concerns have led the Court
to conclude that a unitary, national system of pension regulation best
coheres with ERISA's needs.12s
When employers have multistate operations or employees, uniformity would be defeated by differing state common law approaches
to unjust enrichment. 126 Disuniformity would hold pension plans hostage to precisely the types of conflicting regulatory authority and uncertainty BRISA sought to avoid. 127 Refund policy discrepancies
would force variations in the administrative and accounting practices
120. 111 s. Ct. 403 (1990).
121. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. at 408; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11
(1987) ("A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit
program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce
benefits. • . •").
122. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 105 n.25 (1983).
123. Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11.
124. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105 n.25.
125. See, e.g., Holliday, 111 S. Ct. at 409 (application of state subrogation laws frustrates
"administrators' continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefit levels nationwide") (emphasis
added); Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11 ("Pre-emption ensures that the administrative
practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single set ofregulations.") (emphasis added);
Alessi v. Raybestos·Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) (Congress "meant to establish
pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.") (emphasis added).
As Representative John Dent, ERISA's House sponsor championed, "I wish to make note of
what is to many the crowning achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans." 120 CoNG. REc. 29,197 (1974).
See also Dept. of Labor Op. Letter No. 76-90 (July 14, 1976) (available in LEXIS, Labor library,
ERISA file) [hereinafter Dept. of Labor Op. Letter] (pervasive federal interest in pension
regulation).
126. See Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1979) ("in order to provide for
uniform regulation of employee benefit plans . • • ERISA preempts any state law permitting
refund of [improperly paid] contributions") (footnotes omitted); cf. Gilbert v. Burlington Indus.,
765 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 1985) (state common law applied to employees in sixteen different
states defeats "[t]he policy favoring national uniformity"), ajfd., 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Authier v.
Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1985) (recourse available to discharged fiduciaries should
not depend on fortuitous state law interpretation of ERISA), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888 (1985).
127. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (New York employee pension antidiscrimination law preempted due to possible inconsistency with other states' law); Alessi v.
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of multistate plans, leading to considerable ine:fficiencies. 128 Pension
plans and, ultimately, pensioners, would bear the burden of cost and
delay in protracted preemption129 and choice of law 130 litigation. Finally, substantial temptation for opportunistic forum shopping would
arise as multistate employers sought to recover overpayments in the
most favorable jurisdictions. 131 The threat of inconsistent or conflicting state rules regarding unjust enrichment suggests that state laws
should be preempted.
BRISA cannot rely on state law for supplementation; the breadth
of its preemption provision forecloses that possibility. Congress foresaw this problem and gave federal courts the ability to augment
BRISA where appropriate. A congressional authorization of the
power to create federal common law complements BRISA's invalidation of state laws.
B. Delegated Lawmaking for ERISA

Courts generally hesitate to supplement acts of Congress with
common law, supposing that most legislative enactments warrant no
further :fine-tuning. 132 In a few limited instances, however, courts develop legal rules in the common law tradition. Where Congress directs the courts, either explicitly or implicitly, to build upon the rules
provided by a statutory framework, courts may develop substantive
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) (New Jersey statute that forbid certain
benefit calculations permitted under federal law preempted by BRISA).
128. See Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 9:
An employer that makes a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a
host of [administrative] obligations, such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit
payments, and keeping appropriate records • • . • The most efficient way to meet these
responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme • . . • Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in
differing States. A plan would be required to keep certain records in some States but not in
others; .•. to process claims in a certain way in some States; ••. and to comply with certain
fiduciary standards in some States but not in others.
129. See 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (prediction of Sen. Javits) (anticipating "endless
litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation ..•."); Dept.
of Labor Op. Letter, supra note 125 (broad preemption language averts "litigation that would
result from piecemeal preemption").
130. Cf. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 712-13 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting) (concern, in LMRA context, over "which of several competing state statutes is to be
applied and whether such application is reasonable when tested by the federal labor policy").
131. Cf. Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 474 U.S. 1087 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (differing administrative exhaustion requirements raise the "troubling
effect of encouraging forum shopping'' particularly where "the coverage of particular BRISA
plans frequently extends to beneficiaries in more than one State - and, no doubt, in more than
one judicial circuit").
132. See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. RadclitrMaterials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (no contribution
right in Sherman Act cases); Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77
(1981) (no common law right of contribution in title VII cases); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647 (1963) (no cause of action for abuse of statutory subpoena power).
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law consistent with the statute's goals. 133 BRISA provides direct and
indirect evidence that Congress envisioned such lawmaking power for
the federal courts in the area of pensions.
The clearest case for the evolution of federal common law arises
where Congress explicitly calls upon the courts to fulfill this role. 134
The paradigmatic example of such wholesale assignment of the legislative role to the judiciary is the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA).135 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 13 6 the
Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional grant contained in the statute did more than confer upon the district courts the power to hear
.cases arising under the Act. Rather, the legislation expressed an intention on the part of Congress that the federal courts develop substantive
law to supplement the statutory framework. 137 Commentators regard
this "wholesale" creation of substantive common law as the broadest
statement of the courts' ability to create such rules.1 38
BRISA's legislative history evinces a similar congressional desire
to vest the courts with lawmaking authority. Numerous references to
the LMRA model punctuated BRISA's passage through Congress. In
the debate over BRISA, Senator Harrison Williams, Jr., one of BRISA's sponsors, explicitly 'invoked the LMRA doctrine as the appropriate model for BRISA: "It is intended that such actions will be
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act." 139 Senator Javits, BRISA's other principal sponsor,
133. See generally 19 c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE·
DURE § 4514 (1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER].
134. See E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.32 (1989); Merrill, The Common
Law Powers ofFederal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 1, 40 (1985) (express delegation oflawmaking
function to courts "consistent with internal norm of legitimacy").
135. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97
(1988)).
136. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
137. See 353 U.S. at 456-57:
[T]he substantive law to apply in suits under section 30l(a) is federal law, which the courts
must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. The Labor Management Relations
Act expressly furnishes some substantive law..•. Other problems will lie in the penumbra
of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved
by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem.
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law.
(citations omitted).
138. See 19 c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, supra note 133, § 4514 (1984). Another
area where Congress has requested the Courts to develop a body of federal law is the antitrust
sphere. See, e.g., National Socy. of Professional Engrs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(Sherman Act calls for common law supplementation and interpretation).
A similarly uninhibited license, although of different origin, derives from article Ill's creation
of a federal admiralty jurisdiction. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1; Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (recognition of cause of action for wrongful death vindicates constitutionally based principle of uniform, national law of admiralty).
139. 120 CoNG. RE.c. 29,933 (1974).
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echoed similar sentiments: "It is also intended that a body of Federal
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension
plans." 140 The committees authoring and recommending the bill's
passage shared a similar understanding.141
Many courts have considered these definitive references to the
LMRA as a sufficient signal to develop federal common law. 142
Courts have developed, for instance, common law remedies for employers, 143 employees, 144 and pension funds, 145 where necessary to effectuate BRISA's purposes.
Substantial indirect evidence supports this conclusion. BRISA frequently uses common law terms in defining its commands. For example, the use of the word "trust" 146 and the phrase "mistake of fact or
law" 147 incorporate common law concepts into BRISA. As Professor
Merrill points out, when "Congress has, in effect, federalized a body of
common law principles, then it would seem that in all probability it
intended that federal courts would continue to develop that body of
law in the common law tradition." 148 Congressional election of language embodying common law precepts indicates "that the enacting
body has delegated common law powers to federal courts." 149 In light
of the express and implied congressional authorization of lawmaking
power, courts have full license to develop a federal common law of
pensions under BRISA.
140. 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (emphasis added).
141. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5107 (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference).
142. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54-56 (1987); Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989); Anderson v. John
Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Congress intended that a body of federal
substantive law be developed to fill in the gaps left by ERISA's express provisions"); Whitworth
Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 234-35 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d
1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984) (ERISA contemplates common lawmaking identical to LMRA);
Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980).
143. Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Western Pa. Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund, 847
F.2d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1988) (federal common law permits employer's claim for fraudulent assessment of withdrawal liability), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1988).
144. See, e.g., Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 237-39 (3d Cir. 1980) {federal common law permits employees to recover contractually obligated benefits), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1142 (1982).
145. See, e.g., Northeast Depl ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union
No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 157 {3d Cir. 1985) {federal common law permits suits by
one fund against another).
146. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (inclusion of
trust concept supports "'federal common law of rights and obligations under BRISA-regulated
plans'") (citation omitted).
147. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
148. Merrill, supra note 134, at 44.
149. Id.
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C. Evading Common Lawmaking
Despite clear congressional intention that a federal common law of
pensions evolve, some courts, while grudgingly acknowledging the obligation to create common law, have nonetheless done so in a cramped
and narrow fashion. 150 The hesitance to fashion common law misreads Congress' intent and misapplies common law principles. These
refusals misapprehend the distinction between implication of statutory
remedies and judicial creation of common law ones. The determination that Congress has not directly reposited relief for employers in
ERISA 151 does not foreclose the possibility of relief altogether. 152 As
the Third Circuit observed in Plucinski v. LA.M. National Pension
Fund,
[W]e do not believe that by enacting section 403 of ERISA, which siinply permits funds to refund mistaken contributions, Congress intended
to foreclose the courts from investing employers with a remedy. The
existence of section 403 shows that Congress reached a consensus that
pension funds should be allowed to return such contributions; but it does
not demonstrate any consensus by Congress against judicial recognition
of a common law action allowing employers to sue for equitable
restitution. 153

Courts may nonetheless create common law relief for employers because the relevant inquiries for ascertaining the existence of statutory
and common law remedies differ. 154 Proof of explicit legislative approval of a particular remedy is not demanded where Congress dele150. See, e.g., National Benefit Admin. v. Mississippi Methodist Hosp. & Rehabilitation
Center, 748 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D. Miss. 1990) ("While Congress did intend that the courts
develop federal common law to be applied in ERISA cases ••• Congress did not authorize the
courts to develop or allow causes of action or remedies not expressly provided for in § 1132 ••••
Either plaintiff's ERISA claim arises under the express provisions of the Act, or it does not
exist.") (citations omitted); Florida W. Coast Operating Engrs. Local 925 Welfare Fund v. Sunbelt Sales & Rentals, 732 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Morales v. Pan American Life
Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D. La. 1989), ajfd., 914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990).
151. See supra Part I.
152. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1969) (courts may
fashion relief to effectuate vindication of statutory rights, even where statute silent as to remedy).
153. 875 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1989). As one lower court commented, "in saying that
BRISA 'does not prohibit' a refund .•. Congress implicitly left open the possibility that some
other law might compel [one]. As we have concluded that Congress did not ••• create a [statutory] right of action .•. this can only have been a common law equitable action." Soft Drink
Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. Supp. 743, 751
(N.D. lli. 1988); accord Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Houston Pipe Line
Co., 713 F. Supp. 1527, 1534 (N.D. m. 1989) (lack of implied remedy does not close door on
equitable common law relief); see also Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp 943, 951 (D. Del. 1985) ("[T]he result of the Cort v. Ash analysis ••. was
not that Congress intended to forbid this cause of action [unjust enrichment], but only that there
is insufficient evidence that Congress intended to provide a remedy under § l 103(c)(2)(A)(ii)."),
modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988).
154. Recent Supreme Court opinions treat the questions discretely. See, e.g., Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 4 (1981); Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 633 (1981); Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 79 (1981).
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gates to the courts the responsibility of creating substantive common
law. 155 Courts should not ask whether Congress specifically intended
the proposed remedy, but instead should determine whether granting
relief furthers the purposes of the statutory scheme. 156 By confusing
the two very separate analytic inquiries, those courts hesitating to create common law have abridged the obligation imposed upon them by
BRISA.
A related deficiency in the reasoning of courts refusing to graft
common law onto BRISA stems from the ascription of significance to
its comprehensive regulatory structure. Some courts will not fashion
common law remedies under BRISA, reasoning that courts should not
upset the balances struck in federal statutes. 157 For instance, the Second Circuit in Amato v. Western Union lnternational1 58 displayed extreme deference to the explicit statutory framework in deciding
whether to permit an action for unjust enrichment brought by employees against an employer. While acknowledging that "[i]n appropriate
circumstances, courts may develop a federal common law under
BRISA," 159 the court nonetheless concluded that a common law remedy was inappropriate:
"[W]here Congress has established an extensive regulatory network and
has expressly announced its intention to occupy the field, federal courts
will not lightly create additional rights under the rubric of federal common law." Such is the case with the ERISA provisions before us here,
which are "comprehensive and reticulated." ... [W]e find no need in the
circumstances of this case to supplement these specific statutory sections
with an ERISA common law of unjust enrichment. 160

The internal logic of this reasoning is not pertinent in the context
of the BRISA provisions involved here. Congress often legislates
broadly, leaving the courts the task of filling in the interstices of a
statute. As Professor Chemerinsky notes, "[t]his type of federal common law is easily justified. In adopting statutes, Congress cannot foresee every possibility. Inevitably, statutes have gaps and the
application of statutes to specific situations requires the development
of rules not created within the laws." 161 BRISA was not intended to
155. See Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1989).
156. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
157. See, e.g., Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986); Techmeier
ex rel. Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 390-91 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986).
158. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985).
159. 773 F.2d at 1419.
160. 773 F.2d at 1419 (citations omitted).
161. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, § 6.3.1 (1989); see also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Were we bereft
of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the recognized
futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms of the Constitution itself."); L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at§ 3-23 (recognizing "the development of judicial rules
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address every issue that might arise, relying instead on courts to fashion new rules as necessary. 162 Furthermore, the mistaken contribution
section does not contain a complex or interrelated web of remedies;
indeed, the interpretation dispute centers on how best to interpret its
lack of remedial mechanism. 163 The legislative history is devoid of
suggestion that the refund section is the product of any compromise or
debate. 164
Timidity in creating federal common law for BRISA also ignores
the relationship between the broad preemptive effect of BRISA165 and
the need for federal decision rules. When a federal statute so pervasively governs an area of the law, federal common law must be relied
upon to determine legal relations. 166 Because BRISA preempts state
law in areas even where it substitutes no explicit rule of its own, 167
federal common law must fill the resultant gaps in the statute lest a
void be created. The reach of the preemption clause compels the development of a common law of pensions.
to cover gaps in the existing framework of federal constitutional and statutory law"); Mishkin,

The Variousness of "Federal Law'~· Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and
State Rules for Decision. 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957) ("effective constitutionalism requires [ot] federal courts ... ~udicial legislation,' rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the large by Congress").
162. Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984)
("[C)ongress realized that the bare terms •.• would not be sufficient . • . . [and] empowered the
courts to develop .•. a body of federal common law governing employee benefit plans. • • • First,
it supplements the statutory scheme interstitially. Second and more generally, it serves to ramify
and develop the standards that the statute sets out in only general terms.") (citations omitted);
see also Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1079 (7th Cir. 1983):
ERISA is a comprehensive statute intended by Congress to federalize the law relating to
employee insurance and benefit plans . . . . As with many other like statutes, Congress
obviously did not expressly address all the issues that might arise. Therefore, we ought,
where unanticipated problems are presented, to develop substantive legal principles that
accommodate the purposes of the statute.
(citations omitted).
163. See Award Serv. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 774 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985)
(no remedial ecology to refund provisions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986); Soft Drink Indus.
Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. Supp. 743, 750-51 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (ERISA not so comprehensive as to "actually determine[] an employer's right to restitution"); see also Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1989)
(unjust enrichment action "will fill in the interstices of ERISA and further .•• [its] purposes");
Airco Ind. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 951 (D. Del.
1985) (equitable unjust enrichment action necessary to fill in interstices of ERISA framework),
modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988).
164. Cf Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818-19 (1980) ("[I]n light of the tempestuous
legislative proceedings that produced [title VII) •.. the ultimate product reflects other • , . purposes that some members of Congress sought to achieve. The present language was clearly the
result of a compromise.").
165. See supra notes 85-131 and accompanying text.
166. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (legal relations must
be determined by policy and content of federal law where area so dominated by sweep of federal
statute).
167. See White Farm Equip. Co. v. White Motor Corp., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1986).

June 1991]

Note -

Recapturing ERISA Overpayments

2027

D. Common Law Content: State or Federal?
In support of the preemption of state laws, this Note has advanced
a range of considerations implying a need for consistent national pension regulation. 168 Those arguments also urge the establishment of a
body of uniform federal rules. 169 The decision to formulate a uniform
rule, rather than adopting state rules for federal purposes, must reflect
the federal substantive need for uniformity.17° Rather than absorbing
state law as the appropriate federal common law, 171 BRISA demands
remedies appropriate to its role as the sole federal statement of pension
policy.
The LMRA model, from which BRISA derives,1 72 informs the decision whether to use state or federal rules. The LMRA required predictability in the negotiation of interstate labor contracts; thus,
uniform federal rules comprise its common law. 173 BRISA also requires predictability because the uncertainty attendant upon multiple
and conflicting regimes of law would unduly complicate decisionmaking and planning for pension plans. 174 The need for uniformity has led
many courts to discard state decision rules, adopting instead uniform
federal pension standards.11s
Thus Congress left to the courts the task of creating federal com168. See supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
169. See P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MlsHKJN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL CoURTS & TIIE FEDERAL SYSTEM 895-96 (3d ed. 1988) (interstitial common lawmaking "shades into - and is of necessity often indistinguishable from - the pervasive question of
the extent to which federal regulation displaces or preempts pre-existing state law"); WRIGHT,
MILLER & CooPER, supra note 133, § 4514 (declaring that "many of the factors that are relevant
to choosing between state law and an independent federal standard as a matter of federal common law also are relevant to deciding whether state law has been preempted by a federal
statute").
170. The need for a uniform regime of law in an area has historically spurred the evolution of
federal common law. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970) (admiralty); International Assn. of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 691-92 (1963) (Railway Labor Act). Compare Mishkin, supra note 161, at 813 (arguing that too often demands for
uniform rules mask "implicitjudgment[s] about the relative value of federalism" rather than an
identifiable substantive need for predictability).
171. Federal common law may absorb state substantive law as the appropriate rule of decision, even though federal law technically applies. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341
(1966) (state substantive law absorbed where no identifiable federal interest present); DeSylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (more convenient to adopt "ready-made body of state law to
define the word 'children' " in federal statute); United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S.
725 (1950) (congressional intent to incorporate state law).
172. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
173. See Allis·Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985) (''The interests of interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to
uniform federal interpretation."); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-05
(1962).
174. See supra notes 116-31 (importance of uniformity in securing benefit levels).
175. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident. Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir.
1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); White Farm Equip. Co. v. White Motor Corp., 788
F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985).
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mon law. Entirely separate is the question of which common law remedies are appropriate. Although many of the factors relevant to the
need for common law guide the shaping of common law relief, the
formulation of appropriate common law rules requires a full and
searching inquiry into ERISA's purposes and aims. Part III identifies
ERISA's various policy objectives and suggests a common law remedy
that optimizes their advancement.
III.

FuRTHERING

ERISA's AIMS

BY PREVENTING
ENRICHMENT

UNJUST

General principles of federal common law, as well as the explicit
and implicit purposes of the statute, should inform common lawmaking under ERISA. 176 When fashioning common law remedies, courts
should examine ERISA's broad purposes rather than focusing narrowly on isolated provisions. 177 In its broadest formulation, BRISA
seeks to maximize retirement security for individuals. It advances that
general goal by increasing the number of pension plans and the
number of employees covered by those plans, and by guaranteeing a
stable level of benefits to participants. 178 This Part argues that
ERISA's twin strategies of maximal employer participation and maximal protection of fund assets can best be secured by recognizing a
federal common law action for unjust enrichment.
A. Maximizing Pension Participation
Undoubtedly, ERISA's raison d'etre was the protection of employee pension rights. But Congress also recognized that an absolute
preference for protecting employees, at the expense of employers, was
not feasible. In a system of voluntary pension plan participation,
ERISA's drafters acknowledged that draconian pension regulations
could discourage employers from participating. Ensuring that employers' costs do not exceed the anticipated benefits derived from offering retirement benefits best furthers the congressional goal of maximal
participation. Contributions paid by mistake represent needless costs
176. Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 281 (7th
Cir. 1990) (en bane) ("When BRISA is silent on an issue, a federal court must fashion federal
common law rules to govern BRISA suits. In making such rules, we must of course look to the
statute itself for guidance ....")(citations omitted), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 67 (1990); U.S. Steel
Mining Co. v. District 17, United Mill Workers, 897 F.2d 149, 153, (4th Cir. 1990) (in crafting
common law, court is "constrained to fashion only those remedies that are appropriate and necessary to effectuate the purposes of BRISA"); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th
Cir. 1986) (common law must be consistent with BRISA's regulatory scheme).
177. See U.S. Steel Mining Co., 897 F.2d at 153 (necessary to read specific sections ofERISA
"in the broader context of the statute and not in isolation").
178. ERISA's stated "objective is to increase the number of individuals participating in employer-financed retirement plans [and] to make sure to the greatest extent possible that those who
do participate in such plans actually receive benefits ...." S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4898.
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that discourage the maintenance and growth of private pensions. Permitting employers to recapture erroneous payments eliminates these
disincentives to plan growth.
1. Encouraging Employer Participation
ERISA's legislative history records an unmistakable congressional
intention to expand the scope and quality of private pension coverage.119 One Senate report justified BRISA by predicting that "[t]he
enactment of progressive and effective pension legislation" would "restore credibility and faith in the private pension plans . . . and this
should serve to encourage ... efforts by management and industry to
expand pension plan coverage and to improve benefits for workers." 180
In addition, indirect evidence emerges from the debates surrounding
enactment of particular regulatory standards. The burdens placed on
employers by additional regulations received careful attention, as Congress was "constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private
retirement plans." 181 Because employers need not sponsor pension
plans, 182 ERISA's costs to employers required full consideration:
[T]he cost of financing pen8ion plans is an important factor in determining whether any particular retirement plan will be adopted and in determining the benefit levels . . . . [U]nduly large increases in costs could
impede the growth and improvement of the private retirement system. . . . [T]he committee has sought to ... strike a balance between
providing meaningful reform and keeping costs within reasonable

limits.183

179. See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4682 ("One of the major objectives of the new legislation is to extend
coverage under retirement plans more widely."); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4640 ("In broad outline, the bill is
designed to • • • promote a renewed expansion of private retirement plans and increase the
number of participants receiving retirement benefits."); 126 CoNG. REc. 20,176 (1980) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("We passed BRISA in order to encourage the growth and maintenance
of private pension plans."); 120 CoNG. REc. 29,198 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ullman) (all requirements "carefully designed to provide adequate protection and, at the same time, provide a
favorable setting for the growth and development of private pension plans"); 120 CoNG. REc.
29,211 (1974) (comment of Rep. Rostenkowski) ("committee and conferees were necessarily cognizant of the need to encourage the continued existence of these [private pension] plans").
180. s. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN
NEWS 4838, 4849.
181. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4639 (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890 (Although legislation "encourages provision
for the retirement needs of many millions of individuals," it also "recognized that private retirement plans are voluntary on the part of the employer."); 120 CoNG. REc. 29,211 (1974) (observation of Rep. Rostenkowski) ("necessary to remember that ... pension plans are voluntarily set
up by employers as an inducement to attract employees").
182. See, e.g., BRISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1988) ("this subchapter shall apply to any
employee benefit plan if is established or maintained") (emphasis added).
183. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4682; see also S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4904; s. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
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The benefits of each additional requirement were carefully weighed
against the disincentives to plan formation created by them, to ensure
the enactment of only net beneficial reforms. As one committee report
concluded, "[i]f employers respond to more comprehensive coverage
... by decreasing benefits under existing plans or slowing the rate of
formation of new plans, little if anything would be gained from the
standpoint of securing broader use of employee pensions ...." 184
The passage of the 1980 amendments to BRISA further demonstrated the core objective of maximizing participation. Many of
ERISA's original provisions retarded plan growth and encouraged
employers to withdraw from pension plans. 185 The remedial Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA) 186 was designed to
ameliorate these disincentives. 187 Furthermore, inducements to new
plan creation were established. 188 The 1980 changes also explicitly re1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4643; 120 CoNG. REC. 4278 (1974) (statement of
Rep. Perkins) ("Each regulation has to be weighed against the burdens and pressures it imposes
on the system. Each requirement has to be weighed against the cost increase which might result.").
For example, the committee resisted proposals that gave employees complete vesting protection since "it is generally recognized that such a requirement for immediate and full vesting
would not be feasible because it would involve such substantial additional coots for the financing
of pension plans that it would tend to impede the adoption of new plans and the liberalization of
existing ones." S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNo. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4904.
184. s. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4890, 4904; see also 120 CoNG. REc. 29,198 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ullman):
It is axiomatic •.. that pension plans cannot be expected to develop if costs are made overly
burdensome, particularly for employers who generally foot most of the bill. This would be
self-defeating and would be unfavorable rather than helpful to the employees for whose
benefit this legislation is designed. For this reason, we have been extremely careful to keep
the additional costs very moderate.
This concern over sub-optimal regulation also resurfaced during the debates over the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, (amend·
ing ERISA). See, e.g., 126 CoNG. REc. 20,177 (1980) (observation of Sen. Williams) (necessity of
phasing in new requirements); 126 CoNG. REc. 20,181 (1980) (concern of Sen. Dole) (overburdening employers leads to termination).
185. See H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., part I, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2928 (then current rules encouraged withdrawals and penalized
remaining employers); 126 CoNG. REc. 20,176 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (due to lack of
penalties for and inequitable distribution of costs of withdrawal, "[t]he present system encourages employers to abandon a weak plan at the first sign the industry is in trouble").
186. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980).
187. See 126 CoNG. REc. 20,176-77 (1980) (statement by Sen. Williams) ("In order to carry
out the policy of .•. encouraging the growth and maintenance of multiemployer plans," the bill
makes changes in current law "to remove the incentives for employers to withdraw .•••"); 126
CoNG. REc. 20,178 (1980) (statement of Sen. Javits) (''Two basic purposes of the bill are to
protect participants and beneficiaries ..• and to eliminate problems that impede the maintenance
and growth of such plans."); see also Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 3 (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 100la(c)(2) (1988)) (policy of act "to alleviate certain problems which tend to discourage the
maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans); H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. I, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2919, 2933 (discussing
remedial rationale for MPPAA).
188. For instance, the so-called "free look provision" encouraged employers to start new
pension plans by providing them with a grace period, within which they incurred no withdrawal
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affirmed ERISA's commitment to the expansion of the private pension
system. 189
The MPPAA also amended the mistaken contribution section itself in one noteworthy respect. It broadened the mistake of fact provision to include mistakes of law for multiemployer pension funds, and
eliminated harsh time limitations on refunds. 190 The Joint Committee
statement explained that the liberalization responded to concern that
the prior refund rule was "too narrow," 191 suggesting that the changes
deliberately made refunds more accessible.192
Thus Congress had two goals: maximum retirement protection for
pensioners and maximum opportunities fqr pension plan growth.
Congress evidently understood that these aims were in tension to a
certain extent. The legislative history of BRISA chronicles an effort to
optimize the goals served by these regulations. The creation of a federal common law of pensions must proceed against the backdrop of
this legislative purpose of increasing participation.193
2. Paths to Employer-Sponsored Pension Plan Formation
The legislative history provides little conclusive evidence whether
Congress intended the mistaken contribution section to compel refunds.194 The language of section 403(c)(2)(A) on its face appears entirely permissive, employing language such as "shall not prohibit." 195
The Department of Labor, which is charged with enforcing and interliability for termination. See STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN REsOURCES,
96rn CoNG., 2D SESS., S. 1076, THE MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1980: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION 17 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter s.
1076: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION].
189. See H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CoNG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2933 ("The basic policy of the Act is that the retirement income security
of multiemployer plan participants is best assured by fostering the growth and continuance of
multiemp!oyer plans."). Similar changes were enacted in 1986. Among other things, they too
restated ERISA's commitment to private pensions. See Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 238,
§ 11002 (1986) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 100lb(c)(2) (1988)) (policy of Act "to encourage the
maintenance and growth of single-employer defined benefit pension plans").
190. Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 410(a), 94 Stat. 1208, 1308 (1980).
191. JolNT EXPLANATION OF S. 1076: MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENT
ACT OF 1980, reproduced at 126 CoNG. REC. 20,189, 20,208 (1980).
192. See, e.g., Chase v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753
F.2d 744, 750 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (''The mistake of law provision was added [to] ... encourage
more employer and employee pension plan participation," consistent "with MPPAA's intent to
foster plan continuation and growth."); accord Dumac Forestry Serv. v. Inte,mational Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1987); Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks
Unions, 763 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986).
193. Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289 n.13 (5th Cir.
1988); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (E.D. Penn. 1977), affd.
without opinion, 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978).
194. See, e.g., s. 1076: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION, supra note 188, at 43
("contributions must be returned, if at an within six months") (emphasis added).
195. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A) (1988).
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preting BRISA, has declined several opportunities to clarify whether
return of overpayments is mandatory. 196 Some courts have viewed
section 403(c)(2)(A) of the Act as entirely discretionary, subject to the
views of the administrator of the plan; 197 other courts have viewed the
language as indicating a duty to return the funds when the equities
favor it. 198
Those courts holding that the language of this section is merely
permissive reason that it protects administrators from breaching their
fiduciary duties should they elect to refund contributions to employers. Although those courts would permit a trustee to disgorge overpaid funds as a matter of discretion, they would not compel the trustee
to grant a refund. Treating the refund section as purely permissive,
however, raises serious problems. Most notably, this approach provides no incentive for plan administrators to return overcontributions.199 Justifiable reasons, such as fear of legal liability, may inhibit
administrators from responding to refund requests. 200 Less honorable
trustee agendas, such as fraudulent assessment of contribution liability, would also be protected under a purely discretionary system. 201
Finding that a federal common law remedy was required to effectuate
congressional purpose, the First Circuit noted the impotence of a
purely permissive refund system: "Since there would be no incentive
to return mistaken payments voluntarily, the permissive refund mechanism ... would be like a permanently-shut window: decorative, but
of no assistance in letting in a breath of fresh air. We will not lightly
assume that Congress intended to enact a self-nullificatory refund
provision. " 202
Not all courts have been persuaded by the intuitive appeal of this
196. See, e.g., Dept. of Labor Op. Letter, No. 81-30A (Mar. 16, 1981) (available in LEXIS,
Labor library, BRISA file). Responding to a direct inquiry whether mistaken payments must be
returned to employers, the Department merely noted that ERISA's exclusive benefit rule "recognizes an exception ..• in the case of certain employer contributions," and then proceeded to
quote verbatim the language of§ l 103(c)(2)(A), without ever taking a position on whether such a
refund was mandatory. Id. (emphasis added).
197. See, e.g., Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 (11th Cir. 1986); Hardy v. National Kinney, 571 F. Supp. 1214, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
198. See, e.g., Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 967
(1st Cir. 1989).
199. See Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, 536 F. Supp. 365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982); E.M.
Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 517 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (D.
Minn. 1981).
200. Soft Drink Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F.
Supp 743, 750 (N.D. ID. 1988).
201. See, e.g., Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Western Pa. Teamsters & Employers Pension
Fund, 847 F.2d 113, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1988) (trustees' fraudulent assessment of $589,239 in withdrawal liability); see also Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir.
1989) (worrying that, if employers lack judicial remedy, "a trustee could extort extra money
from the employer by force or fraud").
202. Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir.
1989).
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argument. The Eleventh Circuit, in Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 203 noted
in passing that because both employers and employees must be equally
represented on the board of trustees of an employee benefit fund, 204
arbitrary or capricious withholding of mistaken funds is deterred. 205
Such reliance on equal representation assumes confluent interests
among all of the employers on the board, a dubious assumption. Even
if their interests did coincide, equal representation can result in deadlock and inaction. 206
The better reasoned approach is to view this section as requiring a
refund only where equitable principles favor it.207 Failure to construe
broadly the refund provision creates precisely the type of employer
disincentives that Congress sought to avoid. 208 The First Circuit in
Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Service Employees Pension Fund explained
how a niggardly construction of the refund provision would deter
participation:
We are ... loathe to think that Congress meant either to craft a heads-1-

win, tails-you-lose matrix, or to institutionalize a one-sided windfall permitting employee-participants to sponge off an employer's good-faith
bevues. In the long run ... refusing to refund ... excess contributions
could frustrate ERISA's goal of expanding pension plan coverage. Manifest inequity is one effective way of discouraging employers from sponsoring BRISA-qualified plans at all. 209

Not only might a cramped reading of the refund provision drive employers to withdraw from pension plans, it might, for the same reasons, slow the pace of their growth.210
If courts read the mistaken contribution section too restrictively,
employers may also reduce the level of benefits afforded to partici203. 796 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1986).
204. See s. 1076: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND CoNSIDERATION, supra note 188, at 8.
205. Dime Coal 196 F.2d at 399 n.6 (1986).
206. Soft Drink Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F.
Supp 743, 750 (N.D.
1988).
207. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F.
Supp. 943, 950-51 (D. Del. 1985), modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988); Teamsters Local 639Bmployers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 867-68 (4th Cir. 1981). For a
full discussion of the equitable considerations attending the return of such funds, see infra Part

m.

IV.
208. See supra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
209. 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989); accord Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller,
906 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); Chase v. Trustees of the W.
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744, 750 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985); Soft Drink
Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. Supp. 743, 751
(N.D. ill. 1988); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp.
943, 950 (D. Del. 1985), modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988).
210. See Plucinski v. l.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1989) ("It
must be remembered that it is optional for an employer to establish an BRISA qualifying pension
plan. The BRISA statute ••. encourage[s] broad participation. If we put the burden of mistaken
payments wholly on employers, we may discourage some employers from operating BRISA qualifying plans.") (citation omitted).
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pants. Although ERISA enacts stringent procedural requirements,
private parties decide how generous the benefits of a particular plan
will be. 211 Employers who cannot recapture mistaken contributions
could pass on the higher costs to pensioners.212 Little of ERISA's purpose would be secured if employers responded to the increased protection afforded workers with correspondingly reduced benefit levels. 213
Concerns about the health of the private pension sector are particularly apposite today. Despite great strides made in extending pension
participation, nearly half of the nation's full-time private wage and
salary workers do not participate in an employer-sponsored plan. 21 4
Private pensions still control a massive stake in the retirement income
equation,215 but current trends portend danger. Employers have curtailed dramatically the rate of private plan formation. 216 Not one multiemployer pension plan has been created in the United States since
1980;217 thousands of plans were terminated during the past decade. 218
Although the disputed amounts may be quite large, they are often
modest sums. 219 The fact that these mistakes are small in relative
terms, however, is not a basis for reassurance. The greatest gaps in
private pension coverage exist in the small business sector and among
part-time employees.220 Small companies, precisely the sector that the
211. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) ("ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits."); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,
511-13 (1981) (benefits determination left to private parties, not government).
212. See An Employer's Implied Cause of Action, supra note 35, at 245 (costs passed on in
form of lower benefits).
213. Offsetting reductions in benefits as a result of rigorous regulation was another frequently
voiced concern throughout the bill's legislative history. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
18-19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4890, 4904; H.R. REP. No. 807,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4682.
214. Portability of Pension Plan Benefits and Investment of Pension Plan Assets: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Camm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54 (1988) [hereinafter Portability of Pension Plan Benefits Hearings] (testimony of David
Walker, Assistant Secretary of Labor). Since 1979, the percentage of workers covered by pension
plans has actually fallen, from 55.7% in 1979 to approximately 49% today. Stern, Beware: Pensions Are an Endangered Species, L.A. Times, July 30, 1990, at D5, col. 3.
215. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
216. See Stern, supra note 214; Uchitelle, supra note 7.
217. See Employee Pension Protection: Hearings on H.R. 1661 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
14 (1989) [hereinafter Employee Pension Protection] (testimony of Rep. Erlenborn).
218. See Pension Protection Act of 1989, supra note 5, at 1 (comment of Chairman
Metzenbaum).
219. Compare Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Houston Pipe Line Co.,
713 F. Supp. 1527, 1533 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ($3,539,889) with Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d
394, 395 (11th Cir. 1986) ($79,624.31) and Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 152 v.
Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (N.D. W. Va. 1990) ($42,936.87).
220. Portability ofPension Plan Benefits Hearings, supra note 214, at 54 (testimony of David
Walker, Assistant Secretary of Labor); see also Labor Secretary Seeks to Require Workers to Save,
N.Y. Times, May 17, 1990, at A20, col. 4 (Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole's call for "expansion of pension coverage for employees of small businesses").
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private pension system depends upon for its future success, are least
able to absorb the cost of mistaken contributions.22 1
Deadweight losses to these smaller companies negatively impact
the type, as well as the scope, of pension protection. Defined benefit
plans are preferable to defined contribution plans, primarily due to the
guarantee of stable retirement income they provide.222 Yet employers
increasingly elect defined-contribution, rather than defined-benefit, arrangements. 223 Small businesses in particular appear unwilling to offer
defined-benefit pensions. 224 Experts cite the cost of administering defined-benefit plans as the chief reason for this phenomenon.225 Forcing employers to bear the full risk of mistaken payments will only
further inflate these prohibitive costs.
When deciding to create common law rules for BRISA, the federal
courts must, as Congress did in enacting the statute, evaluate the practical effect of such rules on participation in employee benefit plans.
Refusing to let employers recover mistakenly paid contributions creates disincentives for them to participate. Therefore, courts should allow employers to bring unjust enrichment actions against pension
funds that withhold mistaken contributions, thereby furthering the
statute's purpose of inducing employer participation.
B. Safeguarding Pension Fund Assets

The other clear congressional intention in passing BRISA was the
protection of pension assets for the benefit of employees. This section
contends that a rule hampering full and prompt refund of mistaken
overcontributions thwarts this objective because it encourages employers to "set off" against due contributions the amount they believe they
221. See Garland, Congress Has That Lean and Hungry Look, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at
160 (marginal benefits of pensions to employers increasingly outweighed by costs); Kladder &
Durose, Considerations in Negotiating Alternatives to Participation in Multiemployer Pension
Plans, 12 J. PENSION PLANNING & CoMPLIANCE 271, 284 (1986) (high costs dissuade pension
plan formation by private employers); Stem, supra note 214, at DS, col. 3 ("many companies see
the costs of running a pension plan as too high to justify them"); Uchitelle, supra note 7, at Al,
col. 5 (pensions cost-prohibitive for small companies).
222. See, Uchitelle, supra note 7, at DS, col. 1 (defined-contribution plans invariably provide
lower retirement benefits). For other criticisms of defined-contribution plans, see Nathans, The
New Breed of Pensions That May Leave Retirees Poorer. Bus. WEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 164. See
generally E. ALLEN, JR., J. MELONE & J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING 86-104 (5th ed.
1984) (comparing and assessing various contribution and benefit arrangements).
223. See Drew & Tackett, Record Number of Pension Plans Dropped in '89, Chi. Trib., Feb.
9, 1990, at 1, col. 2 (net loss of 10,395 defined-benefit plans in 1989; steepest decline in history);
Stem, supra note 214, at DS, col. 3 (37% increase in defined-benefit terminations, coupled with
67% decrease in their creation); Employee Pension Protection, supra note 217, at 14 (testimony of
former Rep. John N. Erlenbom) (voicing concern over movement out of defined-benefit plans).
224. Pension Protection Act of 1989, supra note 5, at 64 (observation of Karen Ferguson,
Exec. Dir. Pension Rights Center, that "smaller employers tend to go to defined contribution
plans").
225. See Stem, supra note 214; Pension Protection Act of 1989, supra note 5, at 102 (testimony of Chester S. Labedz, Jr., Compensation & Benefits Counsel for Textron, Inc.).
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are entitled to by reason of past mistake. The better approach would
be to allow a separate remedy for these employers, reducing their incentive to try to recoup overpayments by means of self-help. Mitigating the frequency of set-offs would protect the financial integrity of the
plan.
1. ERISA ~ Protection of Fund Assets

BRISA seeks to guarantee retirement security for all working
Americans by ensuring their right to retrieve, upon retirement, the
pension benefits to which they are entitled. To that end, rigorous protection and regulation of pension plan assets is one of its cornerstones.226 This objective manifests itself in congressional insistence on
timely contributions by employers. As the Supreme Court pointed out
in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 221 "one of the principal congressional concerns
motivating the passage of the Act [was] that plans should assure themselves of adequate funding by promptly collecting employer
contributions. " 228
The 1980 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
(MPPAA) 229 further illustrates ERISA's reliance on prompt employer
contributions for its success.230 The MPPAA created for the first time
a statutory obligation requiring full and prompt payment of contribution obligations.231 Provisions of the MPPAA concerning the pay226. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(3) (1988) (policy of the Act is "to increase the likelihood
that participants ••• will receive their full benefits"). See generally BRISA Subchapter I, "Protection ofEmployee Benefit Rights," 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1168 (West Supp. 1991) (comprehensive vesting, disclosure, and reporting requirements).
227. 472 U.S. 577 (1985).
228. 472 U.S. at 580 (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st. Sess. 9-10,
reprinted in 1914 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4846 (''The pension plan which
offers full protection to its employees is one which is funded with accumulated assets which at
least are equal to the accrued liabilities, and with a contribution rate sufficient to maintain that
status at all times.") (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4652 (envisioning system in which "[a]ll current
accruals of benefits based on current service ••• [would] be paid for immediately.").
229. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 13811461 (West Supp. 1991)).
230. See 126 CoNG. REc. 23,039 (1980) (declaration of Rep. Thompson) (intent ofMPPAA
"is to promote the prompt payment of contributions and assist plans in recovering the costs
incurred in connection with delinquencies"); see also Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v.
Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 547 (1988) (''The legislative history of
[MPPAA] explains that Congress added these strict remedies to give employers a strong incentive to honor their contractual obligations to contribute and to facilitate the collection of delinquent accounts.").
231. See MPPAA § 306, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified as BRISA§ 515,
29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1988)) ("Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan ..• shall • • • make such contributions in accordance with
the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement."); see also S. 1076: SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION, supra note 188, at 44 (''The public policy of this legislation •••
mandates that provision be made to discourage delinquencies and simplify delinquency collec-
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ment of withdrawal liability also demonstrate ERISA's solicitude
toward prompt receipt of payment obligations. Under the "pay now,
dispute later" policy of the MPPAA, the withdrawing employer must
make interim payments of withdrawal liability until the discrepancy is
definitively resolved, 232 permitting the fund to make immediate use of
the payment.233
2. Ensuring Prompt Contribution

An undeniable relationship exists between the employers' access to
an effective refund remedy and their timely payment of contributions.
Employers who believe they have contributed more money to a pension fund than necessary often will withhold that amount when making future payments.234 Furthermore, the absence of an effective
remedy may dampen the willingness of employers to contribute
promptly in marginal cases. As one lower court observed, "if employers cannot recover mistaken contributions, they ... may withhold payments when they have any doubt that the payments are required, for
fear that those payments could not be recovered."235
Some courts permit employers to set-off mistaken payments;236 curiously, a few courts further encourage employers to withhold payment by allowing set-offs yet refusing to entertain separate actions for
return of overcontributions. In South Central United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. C & G Markets, the Fifth Circuit condoned
just this type of contradictory result:
[W]e hold that there is a right to offset mistakenly overpaid contributions against a delinquency owed. We wish to make absolutely clear that
we are not establishing any affirmative right of action in favor of the
tion. The bill imposes a federal statutory duty to contribute on employers •.•.") (emphasis
added).
232. See ERISA § 4219 (c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(2); ERISA § 4221, 29 U.S.C. § 1401(d)
(1988).
233. See Flying Tiger Line v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 830 F.2d 1241, 1244 (3d Cir.
1987) (interim payment of withdrawal liability mandatory); Banner Indus. v. Central States, S.E.
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 663 F. Supp. 1292, 1297-98 (N.D. lli. 1987) (preference to let
pension retain money during dispute); Dom's Transp., Inc. v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 578 F.
Supp. 1222, 1232 (D.D.C. 1984) (1980 changes evince "concern with the adverse effects of nonpayment of liability"), ajfd. without opinion, 753 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
234. Because of this perverse incentive structure, employers frequently assert entitlement to
refunds as a counterclaim in delinquency proceedings, rather than in a separate suit. See, e.g.,
Robbins v. Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1988); Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
152 v. Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D.W.V. 1990); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension
Fund v. Borden, 736 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. lli. 1990); Florida W. Coast Operating Engrs. Local 925
Welfare Fund v. Sunbelt Sales & Rentals, 732 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1990); see also Comment, A Path ofNo Return: Employer Overpayments into Employee Benefit Plans, 8 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 68, 82 (1986) (employers set-off mistaken payments).
235. Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943,
950 (D. Del. 1985), modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988).
236. See, e.g., Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce Supply
Co., 611 F.2d 694, 695 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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employer under BRISA. We are simply applying BRISA to permit a
refund of mistakenly overpaid contributions.2 37

Aside from the logical and conceptual inconsistency of allowing
set-offs but not permitting separate actions to recover precisely the
same overpayments, set-offs are undesirable for a variety of other reasons. First, set-offs place the responsibility for resolving the disputed
claim on the pension fund, rather than the employer. It seems inequitable to place the burden on the pension fund when the employer's
mistake created the dispute, particulary because the cost of identifying
and prosecuting delinquencies can be substantial.238 As Representative Frank Thompson, Jr., one of the sponsors of the 1980 amendments, commented, "[s]ome simple collection actions brought by plan
trustees have been converted into lengthy, costly, and complex litigation concerning claims and defenses unrelated to the employer's promise and the plans' entitlement to the contributions."239 If the
collection burden imposed on the fund exceeds the amount in question
the administrator may ultimately decide not to pursue the delinquency. 240 Any collection costs or losses incurred by the fund are really losses in benefits to the individual pensioners; in this light, the
costs of settling the dispute should be borne by the employer. 241
The second disadvantage to the use of set-offs surfaces when the
employer ultimately is not due a return. In such cases the employer
will have profited unjustly from the retention of the disputed amount.
More immediately, the fund will be denied the ability to use the money
productively during the pendency of the dispute. 242 Employee benefits
will be adversely affected, as the passage debate of the MPPAA
recognizes:
237. 836 F.2d 221, 225 (1988), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); see also Ethridge v. Ma·
sonry Contractors, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (limiting employer's remedy to
set-offs).
238. The failure of employers to make timely contributions presently concerns many pension
plans. See Cohen & Gaines, Industry Heavies Weigh in on Pension Shortfall List, Chi. Trib., May
9, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (speculating that current underfunding trends could lead to a "crisis
similar to the one that has engulfed the savings and loan industry"); Swoboda, A Spotlight on
Pension Funding: Amount ofShortfall Put at $14 Billion, Wash. Post, May 8, 1990, at Cl, col. 2.
239. 126 CoNG. REc. 23,039 (1980). Representative Thompson also pointed out that "additional administrative costs are incurred in detecting and collecting delinquencies. Attorneys fees
and other legal costs arise in connection with collection efforts." Id. Dissatisfaction with these
costs have led commentators to argue that the range of permissible employer defenses in collcc·
tion actions should be severely restricted. See Comment, Employment Law ·Imposing Individual

Liability to Simplify Collection and Discourage Delinquencies Under Section 1145 ofthe Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 15 J. CoRP. L. 135, 155-57 (1989).
240. See Comment, supra note 234, at 82-83.
241. Cf. Dom's Transp., Inc. v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 578 F. Supp. 1222, 1239
(D.D.C. 1984) (costs associated with employer withdrawals), ajfd. without opinion, 153 F.2d 166
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
242. See Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete, 484
U.S. 539 (1988); Dom's Transp. v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 578 F. Supp. 1222 (D.D.C.
1984), ajfd. without opinion, 153 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Failure of employers to make promised contributions in a timely fashion
imposes a variety of costs on plans. While contributions remain unpaid,
the plan loses the benefit of investment income that could have been
earned if the past due amounts had been received and invested on
time....
These costs detract from the ability of plans to formulate or meet
funding standards and adversely affect the financial health of plans. Participants and beneficiaries ... bear the heavy cost of delinquencies in the
form of lower benefits . . . .243

Unfunded liabilities caused by delinquent payments also pose the specter of perpetual noncollection due to insolvency.244
The third objection to the use of set-offs derives from the unfair
burdens placed on the other employers in a multiemployer pension
plan. Those employers no longer participating in the plan lack the
ability to recoup overpayments via the set-off mechanism, because
only employers still participating have obligations against which to set
off the overpayment. Whether an employer is still participating in the
plan should bear no relationship to the equitable entitlement to a return of the mistaken contributions. At the same time, the burden of
making up the shortfall due to the set-offs of the other employers falls
squarely on those employers that are still participating.245 It would be
better to rationalize the refund process within the BRISA structure
than to let delinquent employers shift the costs onto those that
promptly comply with their payment obligations.
An amalgamation of prudential considerations comprises the
fourth argument for forcing employers to litigate separately to recover
overpayments. The complexity of collecting delinquencies would only
be exacerbated if the separate issues concerning mistakes were also
litigated concurrently. 246 The use of set-offs might unduly complicate
the mandatory award of interest247 and/or liquidated damages248 that
243. s. 1076: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION, supra note 188, at 43-44; see
also Central States, S.B. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 580
(1985) (delinquencies create "unfunded liabilities [that] jeopardize the participants' and beneficiaries' interests").
244. See Central States, S.B. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472
U.S. 559, 580 (1985).
245. See, Cohen & Gaines, supra note 238 (underfunding liability falls on pension insurance
system and its premium payers); s. 1076: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION, supra
note 188, at 44 (unfair to other employers); cf. Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466
U.S. 364, 373 (1984) (allowing individual employers to negotiate more liberal arbitration procedures disproportionately harms other contributing employers). Similar concerns over equity
prompted the withdrawal liability provisions of the MPPAA. See Laborers Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 545 (1988) (MPPAA "primarily concerned about the burden placed upon the remaining contributors to a multiemployer fund
when one or more of them withdraw").
246. For a description of the expense, delay, and complexity of delinquency proceedings, see
supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
247. BRISA§ 502(g)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(2)(B) (1988).
248. BRISA § 502(g)(2)(C)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(2)(C)(ii) (1988).
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are calculated by the amount of delinquency. 249 The delays spawned
· by such complications only heighten the manifest unfairness to the
pension fund, which is without possession of the assets during the litigation.250 Finally, a separate action would permit a more searching
focus on the full panoply of equitable considerations necessary to permit a return of such contributions.25 1
By refusing to allow separate recovery for overpayments, some
courts unwittingly encourage employers to utilize sub rosa techniques
such as set-offs. Although this Note contends that permitting employers to recover such mistaken contributions ultimately advances the
purposes of BRISA, set-offs are an undesirable vehicle for effectuating
these goals because of the unacceptable costs they pose to pension
funds. The better reasoned approach prevents employers from setting
off funds against legally due contributions. 252 If employers seek return
of mistaken contributions, they should be forced to bring a separate
unjust enrichment action at federal common law.

C.

The Exclusive Benefit Rule: Invitation to Unjust Enrichment?

The issues surrounding refunds of overpayments inescapably intersect with interpretation of section 403(c)(l),253 known as the exclusive
benefit rule, which states that plan assets may not inure to the benefit
of employers but rather must solely benefit participants. Because
BRISA permits refunds as an exception to the exclusive benefit rule, 25 4
allowing discretionary refunds by plan administrators does not violate
any express provision of BRISA. Construing section 403 to grant a
judicially enforceable remedy, however, requires greater caution.
Common law doctrine must conform to the express provisions of the
legislation.255 Strict attention must be paid to whether a proposed
remedy meshes with the aims of the exclusive benefit rule, and with
the intended purposes of the statutory scheme as a whole.256
249. See Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Philadelphia Fruit Exch., 603 F. Supp. 877 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (admitting possibility of separate refund proceedings but refusing to entertain unified
suit because of imprecise derivation of total damages due to commingling effects).
250. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
251. See infra Part IV.
252. See, e.g., Robbins v. Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Given that the funds
are entitled to the full contributions called for by the collective bargaining agreement, it follows
that Lynch is not entitled to recoup sums already paid against this obligation.").
253. BRISA § 403(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(l) (1988).
254. See BRISA § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § l 103(c)(2)(A) (1988). For the text of this section, see supra note 12.
255. See Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989) (courts may not permit
oral modification of pension plans where statute demands written agreements); Nachwalter v.
Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986) (same).
256. This section deals only with the question of whether the return of the amount in question violates the fiduciary standards of BRISA. Quite separate are the issues surrounding the
payment of interest on overcontributions. Even courts permitting refunds of the contribution
amounts forbid the assessment of interest against the fund, because allowing interest would make
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Some courts take the language of section 403 as evidence that Congress did not envision the remedial approach offered by this Note. For
example, the Second Circuit, in Amato v. Western Union International,
Inc., 257 concluded that the purposes of the exclusive benefit rule rendered a common law remedy inappropriate. "Given [its] interpretation ofERISA section 403(c)(l)'s anti-inurement provision," the court
found no need "to supplement these specific statutory sections with an
BRISA common law of unjust enrichment."25 8
Such analysis is shortsighted. First, a restrictive interpretation of
the exclusive benefit rule misreads its intended purpose. Congress
passed ERISA's stringent regulatory requirements due to concern that
employers might loot the assets of their employees' pension funds. 259
The exclusive benefit rule serves as a prophylaxis to prevent such
abuses. 260 Because the remedy advanced by this Note will only be
obtained through legal process, an unjust enrichment remedy in no
way compromises this objective.261 Second, employees and the unions
that represent them have a strong financial incentive to perform a
watchdog function in scrutinizing the activities of employers. 262 Employees and employers frequently take a long-term view of their relationships in structuring pension agreements, 263 yielding an element of
self-deterrence on the part of employers and trustees. Ongoing relathe fund worse off than if the employer had never erred. This net loss to the fund flagrantly
contravenes the exclusive benefit rule. See, e.g., Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 152 v.
Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (N.D. W. Va. 1990); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health &
Welfare Pension Fund, 668 F. Supp. 893, 904-45 (D. Del. 1987) modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d
Cir. 1988).
257. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986).
258. 773 F.2d at 1419.
259. See ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(a) (1988) (congressional finding "that owing to the
lack of ... adequate safeguards concerning the operational soundness and stability of plans ...
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered"); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490
U.S. 107, 112 (1989) (mismanagement of funds a primary concern of ERISA); S. REP. No. 383,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4892 (misuse of
funds motivated ERISA's passage).
260. See Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 960-61
(1st Cir. 1989).
261. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5083 (although "plan assets generally are not to inure to the
benefit of the employer," ERISA permits "an employer's contributions to be returned in cases of
mistake"); see also An Employer's Implied Cause ofAction, supra note 35, at 244-45 (§ 403 "intended to prevent misconduct, insider abuse and corruption" but "not enacted to prevent the
legitimate return of money mistakenly contributed") (footnote omitted); cf Deiches v.
Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund, 572 F. Supp. 766, 773-74 (D.N.J. 1983) (Actions by bankruptcy receivers to recover conveyances by insolvent employers to pension plans, although technically beyond § 403, are permitted. The absence of corruption risk means exclusive benefit rule
is malleable.).
262. Fischel & Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Cantradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule,
55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1119 n.58 (1988).
263. Id. at 1132. For a game theory discussion of the positive behavioral incentives involved
in long·term relations, see R. .AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CooPERATION 126-32 (1984) (increasing frequency and durability of interactive relationship fosters mutual cooperation).
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tions and mutual opportunities for reprisal characterize these settings.
Employers, or trustees appointed by them, have a particularly strong
self-interest in preserving employee morale; concern over the appearance of corruption helps to restrain any potential impropriety by the
employer. 264
Most fundamentally, a literalist interpretation of the exclusive benefit rule fails to comprehend the relationship between employer participation and the recapture of mistaken contributions. An inescapable
nexus exists between the interests of employers and employees; if employers' interests are insufficiently protected, they may reduce the
scope or quality of pension coverage for their employees.26s
Legal rules resolving conflicts among participants, e.g., employers
and employees, that assume the existence of a pension arrangement
undervalue the interests of all parties by failing to consider the critical
interdependence of participants' interests. Professors Fischel and
Langbein make this point by classifying the operation of BRISA rules
as either ex ante or ex post.266 Rules that do not solely benefit employees may seem inconsistent with the exclusive benefit rule, when viewed
in the context of an extant pension fund; viewed, that is, ex post. The
better conceptual approach appraises the benefits of new rules ex ante;
that is, it constructs rules that "approximate the bargain the parties
would have struck had they been able to anticipate and resolve" the
conflict in advance. 267 By assessing a rule ex ante, as Fischel and
Langbein urge, any inconsistency "abates when we come to understand that a contrary rule might lower the rate of plan formulation.
Employees will not be well served by a legal rule that decreases the
incentive to form plans in the first instance."26s
Pension funds are not created by employers for the sole benefit of
employees; as rational utility maximizers, employers establish pension
funds for their own benefit. 269 Both employees and employers should
be deemed ex ante beneficiaries of the pension trust. 270 A rule that
attempts to maximize the welfare of one at the expense of the other
will make both worse off. 271 Congressional inclusion of the refund sec264. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1132 (employers averse to "a reputation for
sharp practice that would harm morale").
265. See supra notes 179-225 and accompanying text.
266. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1127.
267. Id. at 1116; see also R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 82 (1986) (judicial
resolution of unforeseen contingencies that approximates contractual arrangements to which parties would have assented ex ante maximizes joint welfare).
268. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1127.
269. See Pension Protection Act of1989, supra note 5, at 54 (testimony that pension plans are
established to benefit employers as well as workers); E. ALLEN, JR., J. MELONE & J. ROSEN·
BLOOM supra note 222, at 11, 26 (discussing employer motivations for pension creation).
270. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1119, 1128.
271. Id. at 1158. The effect resembles a Prisoner's Dilemma. In the classic Dilemma, two
players are faced with a choice, either cooperate or defect. Each must make his or her decision
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tion evinces awareness of this economic reality. Courts, too, should
interpret the exclusive benefit rule realistically; construing the rule to
allow refund of overpayments best captures the duality of interests
that it serves. 272
IV.

EVALUATING EMPLOYERS' EQUITABLE ENTITLEMENT TO

REFUNDS

This Note has contended that allowing employers to recoup sums
mistakenly paid to employee pension plans will advance the congressional objectives embodied in BRISA. It has maintained that an action for a refund, although not grounded specifically in the statute, is
justified by the broad common law license given to the federal courts
by BRISA. Part IV argues that these claims should be styled unjust
enrichment actions under federal common law.
The blanket refusal of some courts to permit the return of mistakenly paid monies ignores the beneficial effects refunds may have in
certain situations.273 It would be equally unwise, however, to grant
employers a refund in all instances. Courts should make case-by-case
determinations whether to allow return of overpayments,274 relying on
a variety of equitable factors borrowed from general restitutionary
considerations. Section A discusses the particular applicability of equitable precepts in the context of an unjust enrichment action under
without knowing the other's. The payoff for unilateral defection is higher than for unilateral
cooperation. If both defect, both will be worse off than if both had cooperated. Thus, the Dilemma: each player's self-interest motivates him or her to try to take advantage of the other
(defection); only if each is willing to accept the risk (and lower payoft) of cooperation do they
maximize their aggregate utility. For a fascinating application of the Dilemma concept, see R.
AxELROD, supra note 263 (repeated computer simulation of Dilemma proves cooperative strategies most survivable).
272. As Fischel and Langbein conclude,
[w]e believe that ERISA permits the courts to be more forthright in recognizing the employer's interest as beneficiary. ERISA empowers the employer or other sponsor to create,
amend, and terminate plans, to name the fiduciaries, and to recapture excess assets. These
statutory powers evince that pension and benefit plans embody the interests of employers as
well as employees. Moreover, it is a mistake to view a pension plan as a zero sum game, in
which an action that benefits the employer automatically harms the employees. On the
contrary, from the ex ante perspective, the interest of employer and employees converge.
The correct interpretation •.. is the rule that maximizes the joint welfare of both.
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1158 (footnote omitted).
273. See generally supra Part III (common law remedy increases participation and protects
fund assets).
274. If the court ultimately finds an unjust enrichment remedy unwarranted in a particular
case, then that would be a disposition on the merits; jurisdiction still exists to determine whether
a cause of action is colorable. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1945). Compare Airco Indus.
Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1032 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirmingjurisdiction, but not reaching the ultimate question on the merits) with Dime Coal Co. v.
Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 396 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding jurisdiction while refusing to permit federal
common law remedy) and Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1986) (answering both the jurisdiction and the
merits questions affirmatively). See generally supra note 62 (discussing various jurisdictional
theories).
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BRISA. Section B tailors traditional equitable concepts to fit the situations typically arising in overpayment disputes. Although resolution
of particular unjust enrichment claims will of necessity be highly factspecific, this Part provides guidance in weighing the strengths of competing equitable claims certain to recur.

A. Restitution Provides Recovery for Mistaken Payments
The intuition that a person should not profit because of another's
mistake finds expression in the equitable tradition of the common
law. 275 Indeed, an entire legal discipline, premised on notions of justice and fair play,276 has sprung from the precept that "[a] person who
has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to
make restitution to the other."277 According to Professor Palmer, the
prototypical case of unjust enrichment arises where one party "has
performed in the belief that he was obligated to do so, when in fact he
either had no obligation or was not bound to the full extent of the
performance rendered. "278
Such mistaken performance may arise where one party makes a
computational or clerical error,279 misconstrues the terms of the agreement, 280 incorrectly assumes the existence of a condition precedent to
performance,281 mistakenly pays money to a third party on behalf of
another, 282 or performs pursuant to an invalid agreement. 283 These
mistakes in performance typically present compelling cases for restitution of the money.284
The traditional unjust enrichment model provides a useful departure point for analyzing the return of contributions under BRISA.
Many overpayment scenarios involving BRISA plans285 resemble the
275. See, e.g., Osborn v. Phelps, 19 Conn. 63, 76 (1848) (Ellsworth, J., dissenting) ("Errors
are incident to human affairs; and there must somewhere rest a power to grant relief, or there is a
great defect in the administration of justice.").
276. See 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsnnmON § 1.1 (1978) (moral justification for
restitution).
277. See llEsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 1 (1937).
278. G. PALMER, MISTAKE AND UNJUsr ENRICHMENT 21 (1962).
279. See 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.8; llEsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 20 ("Mis·
take as to Extent of Duty or Amount Paid in Discharge Thereof") (1937); 13 S. WILLisroN, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACI'S § 1574 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1970).
280. See 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.8.
281. See G. PALMER, supra note 278, at 27-28; llEsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 18 ("Mistaken Belief in Duty Under a Contract With Payee") (1937).
282. See REsrATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 22 ("Mistake as to Payee") (1937).
283. See REsrATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 15 ("Mistaken Belief in Existence of Contract
with Payee") (1937); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.15.
284. See 2 G. PALMER, supra note276, § 11.5. See generally 66 AM. JUR. 2DRestitution and
Implied Contracts, §§ 118-44 ("Money Paid by Mistake") (1973 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Res·
titution & Implied Contracts] (collecting cases in support of "firmly established general rule that
money paid to another under the influence of a mistake of fact .•• may be recovered").
285. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (canvassing gamut of factual predicates).
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paradigmatic restitution situations depicted in the preceding paragraph. Equitable considerations are particularly relevant in determining whether it is unjust to allow the fund to retain the mistaken
payments, because the language of BRISA frequently alludes to the
lexicon of equity. BRISA's initial statement of policy proclaims that
the purpose of the act is to improve "the equitable character and
soundness of such [pension] plans."286 As one Senate committee explained, BRISA seeks "to provide the full range of legal and equitable
remedies available in both state and federal courts ...." 287 The statute also uses terminology that suggests restitutionary considerations
should be the linchpin of the remedy urged by this Note. BRISA provides for the return of contributions made under mistakes of fact or
law.288 "Mistake of fact" and "mistake of law" are legal terms of art
traditionally thought of as restitutionary in nature. 289 Given the equitable nature of BRISA pension plans, concerns about unjust enrichment are particularly apposite.290
The interest of the employer in return of the money should be
weighed against the interest of the pension fund in its retention. 291
This calculus, made case-by-case, should comprehend all of the equities on both sides. The First Circuit's bellwether analysis in Kwatcher
v. Massachusetts Service Employees Pension Fund 292 alluded to the
careful balancing required in such cases:
286. BRISA § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(c) (1988).
287. s. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4838, 4871. To that end, the statute authorizes the courts to grant "appropriate equitable
relief." BRISA§ 502(a)(3){B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1988).
288. See BRISA § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (c)(2)(A)(i-ii) (1988).
289. See Teamsters Local 639 Employers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d
865, 867 (4th Cir. 1981) (mistake of fact section meant to incorporate traditional equity definition); see also R.EsrATEMENT OF REsrrruTioN § 44 (1937) (test for restitutionary entitlement
identical for "mistake of law" and "mistake ••• offact"); 3 CoRBIN ON CoNTRAcrs §§ 616-617
(1960); 13 S. WILLISrON, supra note 279, § 1574; cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (ERISA's use of word trust invokes common law and equitable fiduciary
principles); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., 472 U.S. 559,
570 (1985).
290. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir. 1990)
("§ 1103(c)(2)(A) indicates a desire to ensure that plan funds are administered equitably and that
no one party, not even plan beneficiaries, should unjustly profit"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512
(1990); Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Western Pa. Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund, 847
F.2d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1988) ("It is axiomatic that ..• a party should not be allowed to profit
from its own wrongs,'' especially since " 'Congress has emphasized the "equitable character'' ' "
of pension plans.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989); Luby v. Teamsters Health & Welfare
Fund, No. 89-5989, 1990 WL 181053 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1990) (1990 WL 181053) (federal common law of unjust enrichment appropriate for BRISA where plan paid benefits to wrong
beneficiary).
291. See Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1057-58 (3d Cir. 1989);
Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. of Blee. Workers, 814 F.d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1987);
Teamsters Local 639 Employers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 868 (8th
Cir. 1981); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Houston Pipe Line Co., 713 F.
Supp. 1527, 1534-45 (N.D. m. 1989).
292. 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989).
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Because no two sets of circumstances are apt to be identical, we offer no
catalog of the many other considerations which will be subject to equitable weighing, save to say that they comprise essentially the type and kind
to which chancery courts, historically, have looked in restitutionary actions. The trial court should consider whatever factors it may reasonably believe shed light on the fairness of reimbursement . . . [including]
general equitable considerations and the guiding principles and purposes
of BRISA. Equity, after all, is meant to be ftexible.293

After all relevant interests have been considered, an employer should
receive a refund of the mistaken contributions only when the equities
weigh in its favor.294

B. Translating ERISA Interests into Equitable Language
Articulation of these general principles proves easier than their
concrete application. Expressing the interests of employees and employers under BRISA in equitable terms often proves problematic.29s
Section B attempts to convert into the parlance of equity the interests
to be evaluated in an unjust enrichment action. Section B.1 translates
the statutorily created interest in the pension fund's financial stability
into equitable nomenclature, arguing that it deserves great weight.
The relationship of the parties' ·contractual agreements to the quasicontract model of restitution is taken up in section B.2. Finally, section B.3 explores the behavioral implications of allowing refunds.
1. Pension Plan's Financial Stability
The most important equitable consideration is the pension plan's
interest in financial stability. Pension plans may develop reliance interests that deserve extreme deference in light of ERISA's clear preference for protecting pension assets. Obsession with the stability of the
fund has driven some courts to adopt a per se refusal to refund overcontributions.296 This section argues that such an overreaction ignores the potentially beneficial effects of such refunds and gives short
shrift to the inherent flexibility of the remedy this Note advances. The
293. 879 F.2d 957, 967 (1st Cir. 1989); see also 2 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 11.6 (Where
relief cannot be fitted" into a general restitution model, "it becomes necessary to mold the
relief so as to do substantial justice in the case at hand.").
294. Award Serv. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pension
Trust Fund, 763 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986).
295. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 668 F. Supp. 893, 901
(D. Del. 1987) (struggling to find a "simple balancing of the equities,'' confounded because "the
basis of the cause of action is ERISA,'' limited because "the court is not acting solely as a court
in equity,'' and groping for a legal standard that can "include the policies of ERISA"), modified,
850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988).
296. See, e.g.. Kann v. Keystone Resources, 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (all
contributions irrevocable); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp.
307, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (exclusive benefit rule absolute bar to restitution), ajfd. without
opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983).
·~ust
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prudent course would allow a refund only when doing so poses no
threat of :financial hardship to the pension plan.
Protection of the :financial integrity of the pension plan is of paramount importance under ERISA.297 This concern is demonstrated by
the imposition of strict :fiduciary duties, 298 vesting requirements, 299 reporting and disclosure rules, 300 and withdrawal liability. 301 Attempts
by any person to reach fund assets are viewed suspiciously. As one
court remarked early in ERISA's history, "[t]he actuarial soundness
of pension funds is ... too important to permit trustees to obligate the
fund to pay pensions to persons not entitled to them under the express
terms of the pension plan."302 This objective might be compromised
by the return of overcontributions. To the extent that return of the
mistaken contributions would jeopardize the :financial stability of a
pension plan, it cannot fairly be characterized as equitable.
First, pension plans may change their position in expectation of
retaining these assets. The contributions may have been put toward
the payment of direct benefits, or used to reduce the obligations of
defined-benefit employers. Second, refunds still may injure the fund
even where the money has not been spent. Pension funds must make
long range actuarial decisions that might be upset by unanticipated
refunds. 303 Stability and predictability are essential to guarantee that
those entitled to pension benefits receive them. 304 Finding substantial
reliance interests present, one lower court explained that "[t]o impose
a right to restitution in favor of employers could severely undermine
the fund's integrity. Mistaken contributions, once invested, may be
just as essential to the funds' integrity and stability as non-mistaken
contributions .... " 305 Neither the employer nor the fund may realize
that the plan is not legally entitled to these contributions before considerable reliance interests have attached.
The concern about the :financial stability of pension funds finds an
analog in the common law of restitution and is prudent, to an extent.
297. See supra notes 226-33 and accompanying text.
298. See BRISA §§ 401-14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (1988).
299. See BRISA §§ 201-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1988).
300. See BRISA §§ 101-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (1988).
301. See BRISA §§ 4201-25, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1405 (1988).
302. Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. Central States, S.B. & S.W.
Areas Pension Fund v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, 511 F. Supp. 38, 47 (D. Minn. 1980)
(damage actions by employers against trustees precluded since they would "deplete the Funds'
assets and thus hinder the achievement of a primary goal of BRISA, protection of the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans").
303. Morales v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D. La. 1989), affd.,
914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990).
304. Techmeier ex rel Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton, 797 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986).
305. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 312 (E.D. Penn.
1982), affd. without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983).
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Defendants in unjust enrichment actions often counter that it would
be inequitable to compel restitution since the recipient of the enrichment has detrimentally relied on the mistaken payment. 306 Rather
than barring refunds absolutely, however, reliance by the pension plan
should be treated as one of the equities to be weighed when deciding
whether to award restitution. 307 Refunding mistaken payments does
not necessarily result in an unambiguous loss for the pension plan.
The refund may, in some situations, be ancillary to an overall reduction in the fund's liabilities. For example, suppose that an employer
has contributed large sums in an employee's name to Plan A, under
the mistaken assumption that the employee is enrolled in Plan A. The
discovery that the employee is actually enrolled in Plan B, although it
will cost Plan A the previous contributions, implies a concomitant reduction in liabilities for Plan A since it will no longer be required to
pay that employee's benefits. 30s
Other structural factors may mitigate the potential injury to the
financial health of pension plans. The time limitations in the statute
for refund minimize the risk oflong-term disruptions in financial planning, 309 because administrators should be aware that claims to the
fund may be made until the limitations period has run. 3 • 0 Refunds
can also be effectuated without an actual disgorgement of funds.
When the employer has an ongoing obligation, credits for future payments can be issued, thus giving the plan time to adapt to the reduction in assets. 311
These observations suggest an approach superior to a categorical
rejection of a remedy for employers. The court should determine
306. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CoNTRAcrs § 9-30 (3d. ed. 1987); REsTATEMENT OP
REsrmmoN § 69(1) (1937) (''The right of a person to restitution from another because of a
benefit received because of mistake is terminated or diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit,
circumstances have so changed that it would be inequitable to require the other to make full
restitution.").
307. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OP REMEDIES§ 11.9 (1973).
308. See Peckham v. Board of Trustees of Intl. Bhd. of Painters, 719 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir.),
modified, 724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983). The court noted that
[t]he trustees complain that a refund will diminish the plan's assets but neglect to mention
the corresponding decrease in the fund's liabilities because the individuals for whom these
contributions were made will not be entitled to pensions. Under the circumstances, the fund
clearly would be unjustly enriched if it retained these monies.
719 F.2d at 1066; see also Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce
Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn. 1979) (noting that "although funds may be reduced, the number of beneficiaries would also be reduced as a result of ineligibility"), ajfd.. 611
F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
309. Return of mistaken contributions to a single-employer pension plan may be had up to
one year after payment; for multiemployer plans, a refund is allowed within six months of the
administrator's determination of the overpayment. See supra note 12 for the full text of
§ 403(c)(2)(A).
310. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co.,
478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.), ajfd., 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
311. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Borden, Inc., 736 F.
Supp. 788, 793 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (issuing credit avoids financial surprise, uncertainty).
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whether a refund will threaten the fund's financial soundness. The
employer should be given an opportunity to adduce evidence that the
plan is actuarially sound, and hence, not susceptible to financial ruin if
the money is returned. 312 The court should take into account the impact a refund will have on the pension's stability and soundness, 313
and should grant the employer's request only if it does not injure the
beneficiaries of the fund. 314 Judicial creativity in fashioning remedies
may make accomodation of the employer's refund request possible
without injuring the fund.
Before concluding that a pension's detrimental reliance on the
overpayment precludes restitution, the court should also appraise the
nature of the reliance. For instance, if the fund has already spent the
money, the court might consider whether the expended funds procured any benefits for participants. If the money has merely been put
toward ordinary expenses, then the pension plan should be required to
return it to the employer. 315 If, however, the fund has procured benefits for participants, such as purchasing insurance for noncovered pensioners, 316 then requiring a return would make the plan worse off than
it was before the employer's mistake. In such a case, the equities
would more strongly favor the pension plan.317
312. Some courts require the trustees to prove a detrimental effect on the fund's fiscal integrity. See Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. of Blee. Workers, 637 F. Supp. 529, 533
(N.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 814 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1987). This would seem to be the appropriate
allocation of burdens under the traditional restitution model because it is a defense to the unjust
enrichment claim. The policy objectives served by BRISA, however, to the extent that they favor
the fund's stability, might assign these burdens differently. This Note expresses no view as to
which party should bear this burden.
313. See Award Serv. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund, 763 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A principal equitable consideration is
whether restitution would undermine the financial stability of the plan."), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1081 (1986); see also Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957,
967 (1st Cir. 1989).
314. See Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1057-58 (3d Cir. 1989);
Chase v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744, 753
(9th Cir. 1985) (only grant restitution if no effect on fund's stability); Dumac Forestry Serv. v.
International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 637 F. Supp. 529, 533 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (permitting refund
after finding no risk of financial adversity), modified, 814 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1987).
315. See D. DOBBS, supra note 307, § 11.5 (courts unsympathetic to recipients when money
put toward expenses that would have been incurred anyway); Restitution & Implied Contracts,
supra note 284, § 136 (satisfaction of existing debts or obligations with erroneous payment no
defense).
316. See Comment, supra note 234, at 74.
317. See South Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. C & G Mkts., 836 F.2d
221, 225 (5th Cir.) (pension plan "entitled to full credit for benefits which were not required" but
were disbursed to "employees for whom contributions were mistakenly received"), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Teamsters Local 639 Employers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, 646
F.2d 865, 867-68 (4th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that expenditure of mistaken payments on employee
benefits might be a defense to a restitution suit); Florida W. Coast Operating Engrs. Local 925
Welfare Fund v. Sunbelt Sales & Rentals, 732 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (equities
favor fund, as against employer, where fund has furnished medical benefits to participants during
dispute).
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2. Statutory Limits and Express Party Agreement
When the pension agreement fails to specify any recourse for employers who overcontribute, permitting employers to attempt to
recoup these payments furthers BRISA's interests. This section of the
Note offers two limitations, however, on refunds under section 403.
First, BRISA's explicit strictures provide an outer boundary that equitable remedies may not breach. Second, assuming that a refund falls
within the range permitted by BRISA, this section contends that it
must also conform to any contractual stipulations of the parties; in
such cases, the parties' mutually assented provisions should control.
As the Sixth Circuit has argued, "any federal common law cause of
action ... based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment would likewise
be limited by the terms of the contract between the parties and federal
law."318
BRISA sets out parameters for the return of mistaken contributions that govern in the abs"ence of effective party choice. In the case
of a multiemployer pension plan, the statute allows return of mistaken
payments made "by a mistake of fact or law . . . within six months
after the plan administrator determines that the contribution was
made by such a mistake." 319 In the case of a pension plan other than a
multiemployer one, BRISA permits a refund for contributions made
"by a mistake of fact . . . within one year after the payment of the
contribution."320 Both the time limit provisions and the differentiation of mistake based on fact or law must be strictly followed, because
Congress obviously intended unique meanings for these terms by its
election of different language in analogous, adjacent provisions. Statutory requirements like these supply an outer limit on the relief available under common law.321
The clearly expressed time limitations on refunds should not be
malleable. Presumably, Congress imposed them to minimize the disruptions that stale refund claims can work upon the fund's reliance
interests attaching to such contributions. 322
The nature of the mistake also serves as a differentiating character318. Crews v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 337 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1986).
319. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (c)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). It is significant that
multiemployer plans may return contributions within six months after the error is discovered,
which may in fact be much later than six months after the payment was made. For single em·
ployer plans, the rule permits return only within one year of payment.
320. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (c)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
321. See Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989) (common law of
estoppel due to oral modification of contract foreclosed because BRISA specifically requires writ·
ten instruments to modify pension arrangements); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960
(11th Cir. 1986) (same). But see Reuther v. Trustees of Trucking Employees, 575 F.2d 1074,
1079 (3d Cir. 1978) (invoking equitable precepts to permit refunds of mistaken payments after
expiration of one year statutory limitation period).
322. See supra notes 303 -11 and accompanying text.
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istic between single and multiemployer plans. Mistake of fact should
be distinguished from mistake of law, since Congress contemplated
that in some cases a mistake of law does not deserve recompense. The
distinction between mistake of fact and law is relevant only when dealing with a single employer pension plan; in the case of a multiemployer plan, either type of mistake suffices. The legislative history
tersely distinguished mistakes of fact and law for purposes of the statute. One House Conference Report cites as an example of mistake of
fact "an arithmetical error in calculating the amounts that were contributed to the plan."323 This limited example has been interpreted to
imply few exceptions to the general rule. 324 In practice, mistake of
fact generally encompasses only computation errors or erroneously
held beliefs that an employee is enrolled in, as opposed to legally covered by, a pension plan. Mistakes about the obligations imposed, or
the coverage afforded, by a particular pension agreement are considered mistakes of law.32s
The second limitation on employer refunds derives directly from
the parties' agreed terms. Quasi-contractual remedies such as restitution may not be used where there is an express agreement of the parties that deals specifically with the contingency.326 Although BRISA
has specific provisions dealing with recapture of overpayments, the
employer and the pension fund are free to modify them in the pension
agreement. Because BRISA evinces considerable deference to the
right of parties to agree to the terms of pension agreements, 327 the
parties may agree to refund provisions substantially less generous than
those contained in the statute. 328 The agreement may limit the time in
323. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 303, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5083.
324. See Audit Serv. v. Morning Star Enters., 881 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1989) (text in
WESTLAW) (knowing contributions on behalf of ineligible employee not mistake of fact or law;
no setofl); British Motor Car Distribs., Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Indus. Welfare Fund,
882 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1989) (incorrect actuarial assumptions not a mistake of fact but rather an
inherent uncertainty in pension agreements; employer not entitled to recover).
325. See Philippines, Micronesia & Orient Navigation Co. v. NYSA-ILA Pension Trust
Fund, 909 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir.) (mistake of fact does not encompass disagreement over definitions of pension agreement terms), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 515 (1990); Crews v. Central States,
S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1986) (misconstruction of terms is
mistake of law, not fact); Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 1979) (reliance on incorrect advice concerning propriety of contributions is "a mistake concerning the coverage of the
agreement which is a mistake of law."); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v.
Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.) (coverage of plan is mistake of
law), ajfd., 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
326. See infra notes 332-36 and accompanying text.
327. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504, 511 (1981) (terms of pension agreements left to parties); Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 1982) ("despite the extensive statutory scheme governing pension plans, Congress left many matters to the
discretion of the parties").
328. See Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 560, 567 n.14 (S.D. Miss.
1987) ("Although BRISA allows for recovery under mistake of fact or mistake oflaw, the parties
to the agreement are free to modify the circumstances under which a refund may be sought").
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which refunds may occur,329 or it might restrict return to only certain
categories of mistake. 330 An outright prohibition on refunds of any
kind could also be negotiated.331
If both parties agree to restrictive refund policies, it is hard to
make a claim that one was unjustly enriched at the other's expense. 332
The Seventh Circuit once observed that "[e]nrichment is not 'unjust'
where it is allowed by the express terms of the pension plan."333 In
the same spirit, the Third Circuit has commented that it is "particularly reluctant to fashion a federal common law doctrine of unjust enrichment when such a right would override a contractual provision,"
since "the presence of an agreement that has not been rescinded precludes application of the quasi-contractual remedy." 334 Although federal courts have broad equitable powers under BRISA, they should
not use them to override express contractual provisions.3 35 Quasi-contractual remedies seek to prevent uncontemplated situations from
working injustice. When the parties have in fact provided for such
contingencies in the agreement, the law of quasi-contract has no
place.336
329. See. e.g., Admiral Packing Co. v. Robert F. Kennedy Farm Workers Medical Plan, 874
F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1989); Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 637 F.
Supp. 529 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 814 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1987); Fuller Cinder Co. v. Central
States Pension Fund, 2 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2458 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
330. See. e.g., Crews v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332 (6th
Cir. 1986) (upholding agreement limiting refunds to mistake of fact only); Electricians Health,
Welfare, & Pension Plans v. Gulino, 594 F. Supp. 1265, 1272-73 (M.D. La. 1984) (same).
331. See. e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 668 F. Supp. 893 (D.
Del. 1987) (adoption of "no refund" policy absolute bar to § 1103 recovery) modified, 850 F.2d
1028 (3d Cir. 1988); Trustees of Central Cal. Prod. Workers' Trust Fund v. Acosta, 6 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2697 (N.D. Calif. 1985) (same).
332. Cf. REsrATEMBNT OF REsrmmoN § 107 comment 1 (1937) ("[A] person is not entitled to compensation on the ground of unjust enrichment ifhe received from the other that which
it was agreed ••• the other should give in return.").
333. Techmeier ex rel Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 390
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986). The court was "particularly reluctant to
fashion a federal common law doctrine of unjust enrichment when such a right would override a
contractual provision in a pension plan." 797 F.2d at 390.
334. Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 1982).
335. See Admiral Packing Co. v. Robert F. Kennedy Farm Workers Medical Plan, 874 F.2d
683, 686 (9th Cir. 1989) (forbidding district court from "set[ting] aside rules affecting pension
benefits where they are fixed by .the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and violate no
command of Congress"); Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir. 1989)
(despite ERISA's "ennobling purposes," courts should not "torture language in an attempt to
force particular results ••• the contracting parties neither intended nor imagined"); Morales v.
Pan American Life Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D. La. 1989) (quasi-contractual damages forbidden; parties limited to only those termination benefits specified in written agreement),
ajfd., 914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990); Searcy v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 728
Pension Trust Fund, 685 F. Supp. 241, 242 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (equitable latitude under BRISA
constrained by express contractual provisions).
336. Even where the pension plan permits refunds pursuant only to an agreed procedure,
employers are not totally without a remedy. The decision to deny a refund under the terms of
the parties' agreement is reviewable under a deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See
Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 814 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1987);
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3. Systemic ERJSA Interests
Traditionally, restitution was granted to one who mistakenly enriched another without reference to the benefactor's fault. 337 The Restatement of Restitution specifically forecloses the negligence of the
transferor as a defense to an unjust enrichment action: "A person who
has conferred a benefit upon another by mistake is not precluded by
the fact that the mistake was due to his lack of care."338 Similarly, the
mistake need not be mutual; the mistake of the payor was sufficient
grounds to make a claim for restitution, even where the recipient had
made no error.339 Finally, the traditional unjust enrichment action
did not consider the size or importance of the mistake; the plaintiff did
not need to show that the mistake was significant to be entitled to
recovery. 340
These traditional principles should be modified when applied to
the BRISA setting. Mistakes do not occur in a sphere of completely
private interest. The relationship is a statutorily created and regulated
one, and therefore involves considerations of public policy. Furthermore, an ongoing relationship exists where similar situations may arise
again. Thus, the equities to be taken into account should also capture
the systemic interests served by the statute as well as notions of individual fairness. 341 Before deciding to return the money, courts should
consider the type of the mistake, its causes, its avoidability, and the
disincentives created by a refund.
Considerable expense, uncertainty, and acrimony attend overpayment disputes. 342 BRISA expresses an interest not only in reducing
such wasteful expenditures by pension funds, but also in securing harmonious relations between employer and pension plan. 343 One equitable consideration that should be evaluated is the effect a refund will
have on the incentive of the employer to make such mistakes again in
Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221,
236 n. 24 (6th Cir.). cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of Intl.
Bhd. of Painters, 719 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir.), modified, 724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983).
337. See D. DOBBS, supra note 307, § 11.7.
338. REsTATEMENT OF REsrrruTION § 59 (1937).
339. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 306, § 9-29; D. DOBBS, supra note 307,
§ 11.7 (1973); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.24.
340. See 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.24. But see Restitution & Implied Contracts,
supra note 284, § 131 (suggesting that "negligence may be relevant in determining whether it is
equitable to allow a recovery").
341. See Soft Drink Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
679 F. Supp. 743, 751 (N.D. ID. 1988) ("Equity provides the proper mediation between the
principles embodied in the refund section and the overall command to which it is an exception."); see also Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 967
(1st Cir. 1989) (court should weigh all factors "against the backdrop of general equitable considerations and the guiding principles and purposes of BRISA").
342. See supra notes 226-52 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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the future. As the Sixth Circuit commented, it is not unreasonable to
demand punctiliousness on the part of employers because "Congress,
in weighing the interests implicated in the context of employee benefit
plans, has favored the financial soundness of the plan and held employers to high standards of accounting."344 Before permitting a refund, the court should consider whether the employer could have
easily avoided the mistake with the exercise of minimal care.345 The
court may inquire whether the employer was in sole control of the
needed information, or was in the best position to determine if a mistake was being made. 346 If the adoption of even rudimentary bookkeeping procedures would mitigate such risks in the future, then
perhaps letting the employer bear the full extent of the loss will have a
positive incentive effect. On the other hand, equity would more
strongly favor the employer if the mistake were the fault of the trustees, as in the case where the trustees supply the employer with invalid
contribution data. 347 In sum, equity has a justifiable interest in trying
to reduce the incidence of disputes over mistaken payments.
CONCLUSION

BRISA optimizes retiree welfare by engrafting onto private pension plans regulations with minimal disincentives to plan maintenance
and growth. In a purely voluntary system, zealous protection of presently accrued benefits would be a Pyrrhic victory if purchased at the
cost of inhibitions on the scope and quality of pension coverage offered. Irretrievable payments made in error to pension funds detract
from the utility employers derive from creating pension arrangements
and therefore discourage employer participation. BRISA gives courts
flexibility to address this disincentive through the mistaken contribution provision. This Note proposes a common law remedy that permits equitable return of erroneous contributions. The restitutionary
model advanced by this Note, capturing traditional equitable precepts
and statutory objectives, permits return of the money only when retention of the overpayment would be unjust.
Courts should interpret section 403 to permit employers to recover
344. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794
F.2d 221, 236 n.24 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1007 (1986); see also Kann v. Keystone
Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (employer should bear full risk of
mistake).
345. See Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 560, 569 (S.D. Miss. 1987)
(no refund if mistake due to "haphazard management" by employer).
346. See Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 963 (1st
Cir. 1989) (employer in best position to monitor own eligibility); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same), ajfd. without opinion,
720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); cf. Connors v. Beth Energy Mines, 920 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1990)
(trustees deprived of equitable tolling defense where they were in best position to realize employer's accounting method erroneous).
347. See Comment, supra note 234, at 75.
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mistakenly paid contributions for two pragmatic reasons. Employers
who must absorb the deadweight loss associated with mistaken payments either reduce the pension coverage offered, or attempt to offset
the error by withholding subsequent payments owing to the fund.
Both possibilities are inferior to a legal remedy that remits overpayments. Rational judicial supervision of the refund process is imperative. A system that relies so heavily on the private sector for its
success cannot long survive if it turns a blind eye to the realities of the
cost-benefit calculus employers face in deciding when to provide pension benefits, if at all.
- J. Daniel Plants

